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1956] MARITAL DEDUCTION EQUALIZATION 1087 
THE MARITAL DEDUCTION AND EQUALIZATION 
UNDER THE FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT 
TAXES BETWEEN COMMON LAW AND 
COMMUNITY PROPERTY STATES 
Paul E. Anderson* 
IN 1948, as the culmination of much dissatisfaction with the treatment of community property under the federal estate and 
gift tax laws, Congress adopted a new formula for the treatment of 
gifts and bequests between spouses; this formula was known as the 
marital deduction. It has remained practically unchanged since 
its adoption and still stands as an integral part of our federal estate 
and gift tax structure. 
The basic purpose of the deduction was to provide equalization 
in estate and gift tax treatment between spouses residing in com-
munity property states and those residing in common law property 
states. The plan of this article is to analyze the marital deduction 
against the experience of eight years to determine whether or not 
it has lived up to this basic purpose. 
I. THE FEDERAL ESTATE TAX 
A. Equalization Under the Adjusted Gross Estate Limitation 
I. Statutory Framework: A Contrast Between the Marital 
Deduction and Community Property. Under the pattern of the 
federal estate tax, the marital deduction is computed upon the 
estate of the decedent; it includes no part whatever of the potential 
estate of the surviving spouse. Thus, we cannot have a true split-
ting of the total family estate under the marital deduction; if any 
splitting is accomplished, it is a bisection of the first decedent's 
estate only. 
But under the civil law, the total community property estate 
is split between the spouses. Each spouse dies owning one-half of 
the total estate. Obviously, there's a difference here. In a moment 
we shall explore it, but first let us examine the statutory mechanics 
that create this potential inequity. 
• A.B. 1948, J.D. 1950, University of Michigan; member, California bar; formerly 
Special Assistant to the Chief Counsel, Bureau of Internal Revenue; partner in Kent 
and Brookes, San Francisco; author of various articles on taxation.-Ed. 
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Section 2056 of the Internal Revenue Code,1 which provides 
for the estate tax marital deduction, is built up of two parts: one 
consists of the clauses, provisos, and subparagraphs relating to the 
type of transfer that qualifies for the deduction; the other limits 
the dollar amount of the deduction, regardless of the nature of the 
transfers made in the estate. It is the latter that causes the above 
inequity. Subsection (c) of section 2056 establishes this "limita-
tion on aggregate of deductions" by prohibiting ·any deduction in 
excess of "50 percent of the value of th.e adjusted gross estate .... " 
The "adjusted gross estate," as defined in subsection 2056 (c) (2), 
is a function of the decedent's gross estate; in over-simplified fash-
ion, we might say that it is the gross estate of the decedent, as figured 
for estate tax purpose, less expenses of administration, claims and 
indebtedness of the estate, and losses incurred in administration.2 
In other words, the maximum deduction allowable is one-half the 
decedent's gross esta"te less claims, etc., otherwise deductible. 
But community property is divided on a different principle. 
Each spouse is entitled to one-half of the community estate,3 and 
consequently only his one-half of the total estate is taxable to the 
estate of the spouse first to die.4 And if the estate consists solely 
of community property, no marital deduction is allowable.5 
2. If the Husband D_ies First. An example will make this 
difference in treatment clear. Let us assume a husband and wife 
1 I.R.C., §2056, as adopted by Public Law 591, c. 736, 83d Cong., 2d sess. (1954); 
26 U.S.C. (Supp. II, 1955) §2056. Unless otherwise specified, all section references con-
tained herein are made to the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. 
2 For a clearer picture, see I.R.C., §§2053, 2054. And note also the "Special Rule in 
Cases Involving Community Property" found in subparagraphs (B) and (C) of §2056 (c). 
3 For example, note Cal. Civ. Code (West, 1954) §16la, which states: "The respective 
interests of the husband and wife in community property during continuance of the 
marriage relation are present, existing and equal interests ..•. " 
4Arizona: Greenwood v. Commissioner, (9th Cir. 1943) 134 F. (2d) 915 (dicta); T.D. 
3138, 4 Cum. Bui. 238 (1921). California: United States v. Goodyear, (9th Cir. 1938) 99 F. 
(2d) 523. Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada and New Mexico: T.D. 3138, 4 Cum. Bui. 238 (1921). 
Texas: G.C.M. 7773, IX-2 Cum. Bui. 426 (1930). Washington: Lang v. Commissioner, 
304 U.S. 264, 58 S.Ct. 880 (1938). 
5 The mechanics for eliminating community property are found in I.R.C., §2056 ( c) (2) (B) 
and (C). The technique used by the code is to require that the decedent's adjusted 
gross estate (which, as we saw, limits the allowable deduction) be reduced, dollar 
for dollar, for each piece of community property included in the gross estate, provided 
the inclusion was only at one-half the value. Thus, if all the estate were one-half interests 
in community property, the adjusted gross estate would be reduced by an amount equal to 
itself, and no marital deduction would be permitted. But if the estate includes separate 
property of the decedent as well as his interests in the community estate, his estate will be 
entitled to a deduction equal to one-half the separate property less the claims, expenses, 
etc., not attributable to the community property. Treas. Reg. 105, §81.47d (b). 
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living in a community property state owning a community estate 
of $400,000, after deduction for claims, expenses, etc. How does 
their tax burden compare with that imposed upon a similar couple 
residing in a common law state? Suppose this second couple also 
owns $400,000 held in joint tenancy, of which the wife has con-
tributed $100,000.6 In both cases let us assume the husband, H, 
dies first. 
Common Law 
H's estate $300,000 
Less marital deduction 150,000 
$150,000 
Less specific exemption 60,000 







The common law states appear to have the better of it. In terms 
of approximate tax, H's estate would owe a tax of $17,900 under 
common law concepts as compared to a $32,700 tax under com-
munity property rules. And this advantage in initial savings is 
inevitably present in all cases in which the spouses each own 
property in a common law state. For instance, if the above example 
were reversed, and the wife, W, died first, the discrepancy would 
be even more striking. If H survived her, her taxable estate would 
be zero ($100,000-$50,000 marital deduction and $60,000 exemp-
tion) in the common law case but $140,000 ($200,000-$60,000 
exemption) in the community property situation. 
This comparative advantage in initial saving of tax is equal to 
the tax upon one-half the estate of the surviving spouse as if that 
one-half were added to the first estate. Thus, the tax on H's com-
munity property estate exceeds the tax upon H's common law tax-
. able estate by the marginal increase in tax if one-half of W's estate 
were added to H's estate. Or, in terms of a formula, we have: 
6 In any case in which the surviving spouse has no property of his own, the tax 
computations are identical in both cases. Thus, if in the above example, H were to own 
the entire $400,000 and all of it were to be included in his gross estate on his death, his 
estate would be entitled to a marital deduction .of $200,000 as well as the $60,000 specific 
exemption, leaving a taxable estate of $140,000 (the same as our community property 
husband). 
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H's community property estate= H's taxable estate at 
common law+ ½ (W's estate) 
Thus, in the above example, we may substitute the figures: 
($200,000-$60,000) = ($150,000-$60,000) + ½ ($100,000), 
or $140,000 = $90,00d + $50,000 
What practical difference does this make? We see a large dis-
crepancy in initial tax, but we also realize that most of this tax 
advantage will be equalized when the surviving spouse dies. Take, 
as an illustration, our first example. Assume the wife, W, dies 
soon after H's death, and she includes in her estate her own prop-
erty plus any additions she may have received as a result of H's 
marital deduction transfers.7 
Common Law Community Property 
W's original estate $100,000 $200,000 
Plus transfers from H 150,000 -0-
W's estate $250,000 $200,000 
Less specific exemption 60,000 60,000 
W's taxable estate $190,000 $140,000 
Here the tax picture is reversed. In a community property 
state, W's estate incurs a $32,700 tax as compared to $47,700 under 
common law rules. Thus the initial common law advantage is 
effectively wiped out. The overall tax burden becomes slightly 
greater for the spouses in the common law state ($65,600 versus 
$65,400) because of the progressive rates of taxation imposed upon 
estates. Being faced with a progressive rate of taxation, we find 
7 Note that as a general rule it is not sound tax planning to bequeath property in 
excess of the deductible amount to the su~ving spouse. This generalization rests upon 
the maxim that one should design his estate plans as to incur no more than one estate 
tax per generation. Thus, if H leaves non-deductible property to W, that non-deductible 
property will be taxed both in H's estate and in W's estate before passing to their de• 
scendants. It is true that under the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, transfers of -property 
between spouses may qualify for the credit for tax on prior transfers (§2013), but this 
credit seldom equals the additional tax burden. Furthermore, this credit is a disappearing 
thing reducing from 100% within two years after the first decedent's death to zero if more 
than ten years elapse before the second spouse dies. 
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that it is generally cheaper taxwise to divide the total family estate 
into two equal units than to use any other division (as in our first 
example of one to three).8 
What practical effect does this difference in treatment have? 
Is it a matter of any serious concern? The answer depends upon 
the importance to the family estate plan of the initial saving in tax. 
Suppose, for instance, we are comparing two one-million dollar 
estates-one in California, the other in Michigan. And let us 
assume that in each case the estate is owned equally between the 
spouses. If the California property is community property, we 
have the following difference in tax result: 
Common Law 
H's gross estate $500,000 
Less marital deduction 250,000 
$250,000 
Less exemption 60,000 
H's taxable estate $190,000 








The inequality between the two property systems amounts to 
$78,800 in taxes; in effect only one-quarter of the family estate is 
taxed on H's death in Michigan, whereas one-half is taxed on H's 
s This suggests another formula for estate planning, which may or may not be useful. 
From a pure tax standpoint, we should design our marital transfers so that the wife's 
potential estate will be equalized with the husband's. To accomplish this result, we may 
use the following formula as a guide: 
Marital deduction = (H's estate + W's estate) - W's estate 
2 
or 
Marital deduction = ($300,000 + $100,000) - $100,000 
2 
Marital deduction = $100,000 
This is considerably less than the maximum marital deduction available to H's estate 
($150,000), but a marital transfer of $100,000 from H to W does equalize the two estates 
at $200,000 apiece, thus accomplishing our objective. But beware of these nice mathe-
matics: not only are they impossible of achievement in practice, but also they impose an 
almost insuperable drafting and administering problem upon those who must carry out 
the testator's mathematical desires. There are usually other, and perhaps even less ex-
pensive, methods of accomplishing the same result. Perhaps W may dissipate part of her 
excessive assets by high living or by inter vivos gifts. 
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death in California.9 Both percentage-wise and money-wise, this 
difference in initial tax is substantial: in this example, the Cali-
fornia spouses pay almost three times the taxes paid by the Mich-
igan spouses at H's death. · 
Not until the death of Ware the two situations equalized; at 
that time, unless W has spent or given away the property, W's 
estate in Michigan will consist of three-quarters of the total but in 
California only one-half. Thus the effect of the inequality in 
treatment is merely to postpone the collection of the tax for the 
period of W's remaining life. This postponement of the tax has 
several important advantages to the couple in the common law state. 
During her life the surviving spouse has the use of the amount of 
taxes so postponed and may invest it for her own benefit. If the 
surviving spouse is comparatively young, the life income earned 
on this saving may be substantial. 
Furthermore, the wife is given this additional period of time in 
which to eliminate, if possible, a major share of the postponed tax. 
To the extent that her estate is depleted, whether by spending, 
losses, casualties, poor management, etc., the postponed estate tax 
will never be paid. She can also dispose of a good portion of her 
estate at gift tax rates and again eliminate the postponed estate tax. 
Thus the theoretical disadvantage of splitting family estates into 
two unequal shares may never be actually suffered. 
As to their community property interests, the California spouses 
have no such option. Because community property must be elim-
inated from the adjusted gross estate ceiling, one-half of the family 
estate is taxed at H's death without opportunity for realizing the 
initial saving of tax on the additional one-quarter. 
To sum up then, we find that a substantial inequality in treat-
ment exists under the present marital deduction formula when the 
husband dies first. At common law, an initial saving in the tax 
may be realized that is not available to community property spouses. 
Theoretically this initial advantage will be wiped out on the wife's 
death, but there is no certainty of its occurring. And, in the in-
terim, the wife in a common law state has the use and enjoyment of 
the saving in tax money not available to her community property 
sister. 
9 Compare the statement of John W. Snyder, Secretary of the Treasury, on March 11, 
1948, to the Senate Finance Committee, Hearings on the Revenue Act of 1948, 80th Cong., 
2d sess., p. 20 at 26 (1948). 
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3. If the Wife Dies First. The community property states are 
the ones enjoying an advantage if the wife dies first. Again we are 
assuming that the wife in the common law jurisdiction is the poorer 
spouse. In the community property states, she is treated as being 
a co-equal owner with her husband of their community property. 
In our first example of the $400,000 estates, owned $300,000 to 
Hand $100,000 to Win the common law state, we find the follow-
ing situation: 
Common Law Community Property 
W's estate $100,000 $200,000 
Less marital deduction 50,000 -0-
$ 50,000 $200,000 
Less specific exemption 60,000 60,000 
W's taxable estate -0- $140,000 
Under this example, at W's death, no estate tax at all is paid in a 
common law state as contrasted to a $32,700 tax for the civil law 
spouses. Again it appears as if it is better for a couple to reside 
in a common law state. But this saving, phenomenal as it may be, 
is only the initial saving; its price is high. 
On H's subsequent death, we must add to his estate the transfers 
received from W. Therefore, on H's death, the picture is the 
following: 
Common Law Community Property 
H's estate $300,000 $200,000 
Add transfers from W 50,000 -0-
Total H's estate $350,000 $200,000 
Less specific exemption 60,000 60,000 
H's taxable estate $290,000 $140,000 
Now the tax burden is reversed. H at common law pays a tax of 
$78,500 against the civil law tax of $32,700. The overall tax 
burden on both estates is $13,100 greater for the spouses residing 
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in a common law state than that resulting to the community prop-
erty couple ($78,500-$65,400). The reason is obvious. Every 
dollar deducted by W as part of a marital transfer to H is added 
to H's already larger estate, swelling its size even more. In other 
words, property is deducted from W's low bracket estate to be 
transferred to H where it is taxed at the highest rates applicable to 
his estate. 
Thus the value of the initial saving in this case is completely 
wiped out.10 In order to salvage any part of the extra tax to be due 
on his death, H would have to take steps during his lifetime to dis-
pose of the property (for insta!}ce, by gifts or consumption), or he 
would have to remarry to qualify someone else as his surviving 
spouse so that a marital dedµction would be allowable in his estate. 
All the advantage lies with the community property states in 
this situation where the poorer spouse dies first. The couple in 
the common law state has lost the chance to split the larger estate 
between themselves for estate tax purposes. If the poorer spouse 
dies without any property, their entire estate will be taxed in one 
estate with no opportunity for equalizing the tax with that levied 
on their community property counterparts. 
In larger estates, this tax disadvantage becomes almost cata-
strophic. Consider the difference in tax on a $2,000,000 estate, 
first, if split between the spouses and, second, if taxed all to the 
husband. In the first case, the tax is approximately $753,200, but 
in the second only $651,400 (2 x $325,700), the difference being 
$101,800, or about 5 percent of the total family estate. But isn't 
this merely a chimerical inequality? Can't the spouses in a com-
mon law state equalize their holdings by gifts between themselves 
and thereby avoid the tax catastrophe resulting from the death of 
the poorer spouse first? 
4. Gifts from Husband to Wife. What is the relative tax 
picture if the richer spouse attempts to plan against the catastrophe 
outlined in the prior section by gifts to the poorer spouse? Can the 
10 These examples illustrate another general rule of tax planning of the marital 
deduction. Never create deductible transfers in the estate of the poorer spouse unless you 
have first designed .an acceptable means of getting rid of the property from the richer 
spouse's estate prior to his death. In this situation, the old, familiar life estate to the 
richer spouse, remainder to children would be the most advantageous transfer to be con-
sidered for the poorer spouse's estate. Although such a transfer would not qualify for the 
marital deduction, being a prohibited terminable interest under I.R.C., §2056 (b), it 
would not later be includible in the richer spouse's gross estate. I.R.C., §2033. 
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estates of the two be equalized prior to the death of either in order 
to avoid the loss of the marital deduction? The answer must be 
that although such gifts are possible, they are not very economical. 
An example will show the reason why: Take a $1,000,000 estate 
owned all by H in a common law state, but as community property 
in the other case. Suppose H in the common law state tries to 
equalize W's holdings by giving her $500,000 before his death. 
Common Law Community Property 
H's original estate $1,000,000 $500,000 
Gifts to W 500,000 -0-
H's estate $ 500,000 $500,000 
Gift tax on transfers11 42,525 -0-
H's estate at death $ 457,475 $500,000 
Now the estates are equalized; regardless of who dies first, the 
maximum gross estate will be $500,000, just as in the community 
property state. But the price paid for this prior-to-death equaliza-
tion is a gift tax of $42,525, a more than minor inequality between 
the two property systems, because no gift tax liability at all is in-
curred in the automatic division of interests in community 
property. 
If, after this planning, the richer spouse dies first, the entire 
amount of gift tax paid is wasted. In the above example, H could 
have transferred the entire $500,000 to W tax-free at his death; by 
his prior act of making gifts he incurred a needless gift tax liability. 
On the other hand, H can still place himself in a better position 
than his community property twin by transferring one-half of his 
remaining estate to W and thus paying an estate tax on only one-
quarter of his total estate: 
11 Computed as follows, taking account of the gift tax marital deduction (I.R.C., 
§§2502, 2523): 
Gross gifts $500,000 
Less marital deduction (½) $250,000 
specific exemption 30,000 280,000 
Taxable gifts 
Gift tax on $220,000 
$220,000 
$ 42,525 
1096 MICHIGAN LAw REVIEW . [ Vol. 54 
Common Law Community Property 
H's estate $457,475 $500,000 
Less marital deduction 228,737 -0-
$228,738 $500,000 
Less specific exemption 60,000 60,000 
H's taxable estate $168,738 $440,000 
Estate tax $ 41,318 $123,500 
Gift tax $ 42,525 -0-
Total tax $ 83,843 $123,500 
This, of course, is another manifestation of the inequality in the 
marital deduction formula pointed out in the first section of this 
article. And this advantage is only in the initial saving in tax; 
the overall tax picture will drastically change this advantage, be-
cause the one-quarter deduction from H's estate will be added to 
the top of W's estate. Three-quarters of their entire estate will be 
pyramided in her taxable estate. Thus, there is little to be gained 
in the search for equalization from the device of gifts to the poorer 
spouse. 
And even if the poorer spouse dies first, still no real tax equal-
ization is achieved. Perhaps we have mitigated the tax catastrophe 
outlined in the prior section, but we have done little beyond that. 
Assuming that W dies first, leaving no property to H to prevent a 
pyramiding effect in his estate, we find that the transfers to the 
second generation beneficiaries are still more expensive for the 
couple in the common law state: 
Common Law Community Property 
W's estate $500,000 $500,000 
H's estate 457,475 500,000 
H's gifts to w 500,000 
W's estate tax 123,500 123,500 
H's estate tax 112,892 123,500 
H's gift tax 42,525 
Total tax burden $278,917 $247,000 
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5. Gifts to Others. Let us return again to our million dollar 
example. Suppose again the million dollar estate is owned all by 
H in a common law state as contrasted to community property 
ownership. As we saw, it does not make tax sense for our common 
law H to attempt to equalize his wife's holdings by giving her 
$500,000. · But what of the utility of giving the same $500,000 
directly to their children?12 
Common Law 
H's estate $1,000,000 
Gifts to children 
Gift tax on transfer13 









Thus we have transferred half of H's common law property out of 
his estate. Consequently his estate will be taxed as if he had taken 
advantage of the marital deduction whether or not W survives him. 
Thus the tax catastrophe that might result from W's prior death, 
coupled with the loss of the deduction, has been cured by this 
expedient. 
But at what price? H has had to pay a federal gift tax of $85,050 
for the privilege of splitting his estate at common law. Is this tax 
payment wasted if H dies first, as it is in the case of taxable gifts 
directly to W? The answer is, no. By paying the $85,050 gift 
tax, H has effectively transferred the $500,000 beyond the effective 
reach of the estate tax levied not only on his own estate but also 
on W's. The upshot is that he has transferred half of his estate at 
12 If necessary, the gift can be from H to W for life, remainder to children. For pur-
poses of the gift tax, no marital deduction would be allowable against the value of the life 
estate to W, but the value of the remainder could properly be split between H and W as 
a joint gift. I.R.C., §2513. See Part III, C infra. 
13 Computed as follows, taking advantage of the split gifts provision (I.R.C., §2513): 
Gross gifts $500,000 
Less W's share of gifts (½) $250,000 
specific exemption 30,000 280,000 
Taxable gifts 
Gift tax on $220,000 
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gift tax rates, which up to a certain point14 is cheaper than a trans-
fer at estate tax rates. If we compare the community property vs. 
common law situation, this conclusion is made clear: 
Common Law Community Property 
H's estate at death $414,950 $500,000 
Less exemption 60,000 60,000 
H's taxable estate $354,950 $440,000 
H's estate tax $ 99,284 $126,500 
W's estate at death $500,000 
Less exemption 60,000 
W's taxable estate $440,000 
W's estate tax $126,500 
Gift tax on H's transfers 85,01;>0 
Total tax liability $184,334 $253,000 
This surprising turn of events does not mean that the common law 
spouses have an advantage; all it means is that the community prop-
erty married couple should get busy and make similar inter vivos 
gifts to realize the same saving in tax. 
The only true inequality remaining in this situation is the dif-
ference in settlements available under the two property systems; 
in the community property case, the spouses achieve the splitting 
of their estate during their lifetime without ( 1) incurring a lifetime 
transfer tax, or (2) giving up their control and management of 
their property. In the case of a couple at common law, both dis-
abilities must be incurred in order to prevent the complete loss 
of the opportunity to split their estate. As planners in common 
law states well know, this is a high price to pay; no one is more 
reluctant to relinquish control over property than he who earned it. 
6. Conclusion. The basic statutory framework of the marital 
deduction in itself works substantial inequity between the two 
property systems. Community property division is effected upon 
14 Generally, gift tax rates are only 75% of the estate tax rates levied upon the same 
brackets. 
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the total community estate; the marital deduction split is available 
only as to the common law estate of the first spouse to die. The 
result is a series of inequalities: 
(1) If the spouses have approximately equal estates, only 
one-fourth of the combined estates need be taxed under the com-
mon law system as against one-half in the civil law states on the first 
death. 
(2) If one spouse himself owns practically all of the couple's 
property and he dies first, the result at common law is practical 
equalization with community property splitting; one-half of the 
combined estates is taxed in either case. This situation appears 
to be the one for which the marital deduction formula was designed. 
(3) Again, if at common law one spouse has all the property 
but he survives his spouse, there will be no tax on the prior death 
of his spouse. But on his death, all of the estate will be taxed in 
his estate. If, by way of contrast, all the property were community 
property, one-half would be taxed in each estate. · 
Only in the "classic case," that is, where the husband owns all 
the property at common law and he dies first, is equalization 
achieved; in the other situations postulated, substantial inequality 
exists between the two property systems. To what extent is the 
"classic case" the typical one in common law states? Certainly it 
is not the invariable one. Despite insurance company and trust 
department statistics, in some cases wives do die before their hus-
bands. Nor is it inconceivable that some of their property may be 
the wives' own. And it is here where the inequalities arise. 
B. The Terminable Interest Rule as an Equalizing Device 
I. Introductory. At the time the 1948 amendments to the 
federal estate tax were proposed, serious concern was expressed 
over the possibility that estate planners in common law states would 
use the marital deduction to pass property to the decedents' bene-
ficiaries without paying any estate tax at all. The typical situation 
that caused them concern was this one: 
H to W for life, remainder to C. 
If the value of the life estate to W were not taxable in H's estate 
on H's death, it never would be taxable: under traditional estate 
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tax rules, no part of the property is taxed in W's estate on her death, 
despite her life estate.15 
Because of this possibility, the "terminable interest rule" was 
inserted into the marital deduction provisions. Basically, the rule 
disqualifies from the measure of the deduction any interest passing 
to the surviving spouse which will terminate or fail 
". ~ . on the lapse of time, on the occurrence of an event or 
contingency, or on the failure of an event or contingency to 
occur . . . [ and] an interest in such property passes or has 
passed (for less than an adequate and full consideration in 
money or money's worth) from the decedent to any person 
other than such surviving spouse ( or the estate of such spouse). 
"16 
Because, in the above transfer, W's life estate in the property is 
one that will terminate on her death and will be succeeded by the 
remainder interest in C on her death, the value of her life estate 
does not qualify for the deduction.17 
If we attempt to break down the marital deduction rule into 
its component factors, we find that the following conditions must be 
present before the rule applies to deny the deduction: 
(1) The surviving spouse's interest must have been carved out 
of the decedent's interest; if it is co-equal to the decedent's interest, 
the terminable interest rule does not apply. 
(2) The partial interest given to the surviving spouse must 
be less in point of time than the decedent's interest; if it is co-equal 
to the decedent's interest timewise, the terminable interest rule 
does not apply. 
(3) The surviving spouse's partial interest in point of time 
must be succeeded by the interest of the other beneficiary who 
shares in the decedent's interest; if the other taker's interest pre-
cedes or is contemporaneous with the surviving spouse's interest, 
the terminable interest rule does not apply. 
(4) The succeeding partial interest in point of time taken by 
the other beneficiary must have been created by the decedent out 
15 I.R.C., §2033; Treas. Reg. 105, §81.13; Hugh D. Rhodes, 41 B.T .A. 62 at 73 (1940), 
nonacq. (as to another issue) 1940-1 Cum. Bul. 8, affd. (8th Cir. 1941) 117 F. (2d) 509; 
Mary Clare Milner, 6 T.C. 874 a·t 881 (1946), acq. 1946-2 Cum. Bul. 4; Williams v. United 
States, (Ct. Cl. 1930) 41 F. (2d) 895 at 897; Davis v. United States, (D.C. N.Y. 1939) 
27 F. Supp. 698 at 700. See Helvering v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 316 U.S. 56 at 59, 
62 S. Ct. 925 (1942). 
161.R.C., §2056 (b)(l). 
17 Treas. Reg. 105, §81.47b (d), example (i). 
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of his interest for less than a full and adequate consideration; if 
the succeeding taker paid for his interest, the terminable interest 
rule does not apply.18 
2. Effect on the "Life Estate to Wife, Remainder Over" Settle-
ment. The terminable interest rule was designed to disqualify 
the "life estate to wife, remainder to others" type of transfer. Con-
sequently, we find that in common law states the use of this type 
of transfer has been abandone~ in any case in which the estate 
planner's objective is the creation of a marital deduction bequest. 
Little concern was expressed in Congress at the time the term-
inable interest rule was adopted. Any furor raised by lawyers in 
common law states in opposition to the virtual scrapping of a 
valuable time-tested estate settlement was overruled by the non-
chalant answer that it was necessary as "a matter of equalization." 
Why a matter of equalization? Because, the argument ran, a hus-
band cannot control the disposition of his wife's one-half com-
munity property interest. He cannot leave her with only a life 
estate in her one-half, because she already owns a fee interest in 
that one-half. In order, therefore, to equalize qualitatively the 
modes of property settlement between the two systems of property 
ownership, we must exclude from the marital deduction any type 
of common law settlement that gives the surviving spouse any 
interest less than an absolute one in the property transferred.19 
But was this assumption true? Has· the disqualification of the 
life estate to the surviving spouse created substantial equality be-
tween the two property systems? The record speaks for itself. 
Normally, it is true that a decedent has no interest in or control 
over his surviving spouse's community property. However, in the 
18 Perhaps it would not be too wrong to say that we have created a modem-day 
"law of shifting uses" to plague ourselves just as medieval lawyers prior to 1536 had to 
contend with the true "shifting use." In any event, the author has found it of value to 
apply the concept of a "shifting use" to interests created under an estate tax transfer to 
assist him in applying the terminable interest rule. As you will recall, a "shifting use" was 
"(a) use which is so limited that it will be made to shift or transfer itself, from one 
beneficiary to another, upon the occurrence of a certain event after its creation. For ex-
ample, an estate is limited to the use of A and his heirs, provided that, upon the return 
of B from Rome, it shall be to the use of C and his heirs; this is a shifting use, which 
transfers itself to C when the event happens." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, 4th ed., 1711 
(1951). 
19 S. Rep. 1013, 80th Cong., 2d sess., 1948-1 Cum. Bnl. 285 at 305. Sugarman, "Estate 
and Gift Tax Equalization-The Marital Deduction," 36 CALIF. L. REv. 223 at 236 (1948); 
Surrey, "Federal Taxation of the Family-The Revenue Act of 1948," 61 HARv. L. REv. 
1097 at 1127 (1948). In addition, estate planners in common law jurisdictions were prob-
ably not too concerned about exchanging the life estate-remainder settlement for the oppor-
tunity of obtaining a plan for splitting estates between spouses for tax purposes. 
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case of the husband dying first, the surviving. widow may be put 
to an election under his will; if she wants to take under his will 
she must consent that her one-half share of the community property 
be disposed of under the terms of the decedent's will as if it had 
been the property of the decedent. Her other choice is i:o renounce 
the will and content herself with her vested one-half interest.20 
The customary use of this so-called "widow's election" is to 
create in the surviving widow a life estate in the whole community 
in exchange for her yielding up the remainder interest in her one-
half. The arrangement for this exchange of interests may be made 
either prior to or after death, but regardless of the mechanics, the 
widow's consent is normally treated as revocable until her hus-
band's death. 
In order to be specific, let us consider an actual case. In Pacific 
National Bank of Seattle, Executor,21 the issue arose whether the 
whole or merely the decedent's one-half of the community estate 
should be included in his gross estate under one of these widow's 
elections. The decedent was the husband. Prior to his death he 
had executed a will that disposed of the entire community estate 
by pouring it into an inter vivos trust previously established by 
him; basically, the trust provided a lifetime income for his wife 
with the corpus to be paid to his son after her death. Attached to 
the will and incorporated by reference in it was a consent form in 
which his wife agreed that her half of the community property 
should pass into the trust and that she would take only those in-
terests in the property that were established by her husband's will. 
Because the will disposed of the entire community, the Com-
missioner attempted to include the entire community in the 
decedent's gross estate. In this attempt he failed. The Board 
held that the property retained its character as community property 
despite the execution of the consent; hence only his own half 
could properly be taxed in the decedent's estate.22 
Here all of the property is transferred in husband's estate, yield-
ing only a life estate in the wife with remainder over. Yet an estate 
tax is paid only on one-half to the community. What we have done 
is to recognize the creation of a terminable interest in the surviving 
20 According to de Funiak [PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY §217 (1943)], the 
election is available principally in California and Texas. Apparently it is also found in 
Washington. Falknor, "Liability <;>f the Entire Community Estate for the Payment of State 
Inheritance Tax Where Husband Undertakes to Dispose of Entire Community Estate 
by Will and Wife Elects to Take Under the Will," 5 WASH. L. REv. 55 (1930). 
2140 B.T.A. 128 (1939), acq. 1939-2 Cum. Bul. 25 at 28. 
22 Accord: Coffman-Dobson Bank &: Trust Co., Executors, 20 B.T .A. 890 (1930),- acq. 
X-1 Cum. Bul. 13 (1931). 
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spouse without forfeiting the estate tax advantage of splitting the 
community estate between the spouses. The fact that the surviving 
widow's interest terminates on her death does not affect the com-
munity property separation of the two estates on her husband's 
death. 
But, in fairness to community property states, two distinctions 
between this type of widow's election and the common law life 
estate-remainder over settlement must be recognized. First, in 
the widow's election situation, the wife must affirmatively consent 
to the transfer; in common law jurisdictions her statutory rights 
in taking against the will must normally be asserted by her and 
are usually considerably less in scope than an outright fee interest 
in one-half the estate. Second, the wife will be treated as having 
made a gift of her remainder interest at the time of her husband's 
death when her consent becomes final. Not only will she incur a 
gift tax at the time of his death,23 but also it is probable that the 
entire value of her one-half of the property remaining in existence 
at the time of her death will be taxed in her estate as a transfer 
subject to a retained life estate.24 
This result shows us forcibly that neither the fisc nor the com-
mon law states are put at a disadvantage revenue-wise because of the 
use of the widow's election in community property states. One 
reason for outlawing the life estate-remainder over settlement was 
to prevent the escape of property from estate taxation. Where 
the widow had no interest in the property in which she acquires a 
life interest on her husband's death, there is no taxable event that 
would place any portion of the property in her estate on her death. 
Consequently, a deduction in her husband's estate would permit 
the property deducted to escape the levy of the tax collector. 
But where the life estate is drawn out of the widow's own prop-
erty, as in the case·of the widow's election, her death does create 
23 Chase National Bank, 25 T.C. No. 74 (1955). The amount of the gift made by the 
wife at the time of her husband's death is the subject of intense controversy at the present 
time. Is it the value of her one-half community estate less the value of her life estate 
therein, i.e., the remainder interest in her estate? Or is it the value of her remainder 
reduced by the consideration she receives for making her transfer, i.e., by the value of 
her life estate in her husband's one-half? In the Chase National Bank case, the Tax Court 
sustained the taxpayer, holding that the value of her gift is her remainder less her life 
estate in the decedent husband's estate. Accord, Mildred Irene Siegel, 26 T.C. No. 91 (1956). 
24 I.R.C., §2036. It has been suggested with some force that the measure of the estate 
tax on her death must be reduced proportionately to reflect the consideration received 
by the decedent wife at the time she made her gift, i.e., the estate tax may be levied only 
on that portion of her property that represents the property transferred by her for which 
she had received no consideration. Brookes, "Tax Consequences of Widow's Elections In 
Community Property States," 1951 UNIV. So. CAL. TAX INSTITUTE 83, 101 (1951). 
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a taxable event and the property is taxable in her estate. Thus 
the property excluded from the husband's estate is included in the 
wife's estate at a later date. 
The discrimination that exists between common law and com-
munity property states is a qualitative one. A type of settlement is 
available in community property states that is denied to spouses in 
common law states. How important in a quantitative sense the 
life estate to wife, remainder over transfer is to families in common 
law states we can only guess. We know, however, that this type of 
disposition is a traditional one and that it is customarily employed 
by testators to control the disposition of the non-deductible half of 
their estates. As to the.deductible one-half, the testator must choose 
between the immediate tax savings that result from the deduction 
and the dangers of entrusting that half of his estate to his wife's 
hands in the form of an absolute transfer. 
Is this a proper result of a policy of integration when a com-
munity property husband can accomplish the result denied to his 
counterpart in the common law state and still obtain the tax sav-
ings inherent in splitting the community estate? Does the term-
inable interest rule serve a useful purpose in achieving integration 
if its effect can be avoided in community property states through 
the medium of the widow's election? True, the widow's election 
requires the consent of the widow to take effect, but is this family 
agreement a sufficient reason to justify the complexities of the 
terminable interest rule? 
3. Effect of the Competency of the Surviving Spouse. Very 
recently a potential area of serious discrimination between com-
mon law and community property states was eliminated by a ruling 
of the Revenue Service.25 The question presented was this: what 
effect does the mental competency of the surviving spouse to accept 
and to dispose of property have on the marital deduction? 
As a general rule, if a bequest is made directly and absolutely 
to the surviving spouse, the decedent's estate will be entitled to 
deduct it, regardless of the spouse's competency or incompetency. 
All that needs to be done is to appoint a guardian for the purpose 
of holding title to the property transferred.26 The same, of course, 
is true of a community property spouse's ownership of her property: 
her disability does not deprive her of the ownership of her one-half. 
25 Rev. Rul. 55-518, Int. Rev. Bul. 1955-33, 11. 
26 Letter Ruling (unpublished), March 16, 1950, CCH FecL Estate and Gift Tax Rep. 
112070.30 (1956). 
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A problem arises, however, in certain cases in which less than 
a full and absolute interest in fee is transferred to the surviving 
spouse. Not all such transfers are disqualified by the terminable 
interest rule. For example, a transfer in trust providing a life 
estate to the wife together with a general power to appoint the 
takers of the corpus on her death would qualify for the deduction 
as one of the recognized exceptions to the terminable interest rule.27 
Generally, we find that any interest that is transferred to the 
surviving spouse in such a manner that it would be taxable in her 
estate (if she still possesses it at death) will qualify as a deductible 
interest in the decedent's estate. Thus we have a number of fairly 
common and well recognized exceptions to the terminable interest 
rule; consider, for example, these illustrations: 
(1) Transfer in trust, income to surviving spouse for life, 
corpus to her estate.28 
(2) Transfer in trust, income to surviving spouse for life, 
corpus to whomever the surviving spouse may appoint.29 
(3) Transfer of life estate to surviving spouse, remain-
der to whomever the surviving spouse may appoint.30 
(4) Payment of interest or installment amounts on life 
insurance proceeds to surviving spouse, remainder of proceeds 
at her death to whomever the surviving spouse may appoint.31 
In all but the first case we find that the surviving spouse must be 
given a power to appoint the corpus in order for the transfer to 
qualify. For this purpose, of course, a power in the surviving spouse 
to consume the corpus is the equivalent of a power to appoint.32 
The problem that exists is this: if the surviving spouse must be 
given a power over the corpus in addition to her life estate, will 
27 One cannot help being wryly amused at this turnabout in legislative concern over 
the qualitative integration of community property and common law concepts. As we 
pointed out above, one of the reasons for disqualifying the life estate-remainder over 
settlement was the alleged fact that such a settlement was not available to a testator in 
community property states. Consider, however, the life estate plus power of disposition 
type of settlement. It too is unavailable to testators in community property states unless 
the consent of the testator's spouse is first obtained. But the latter qualifies for the 
marital deduction whereas the former does not. Why the difference? In the latter case, 
the property will be included in the surviving spouse'.s gross estate, but not in the former. 
This factor, then, ought to be the true test of whether or not an interest is to be deductible: 
any interest that would be includible in the survivor's estate ought to be deductible in the 
decedent's estate. 
28 I.R.C., §2056 (b) (5); Treas. Reg. 105, §81.47a (b) (2). 
29 I.R.C., §2056 (b) (5); Treas. Reg. 105, §81.47a (c). 
30 I.R.C., §2056 (b) (5). 
31 I.R.C., §2056 (b) (6); Treas. Reg. 105, §81.47a (d); Rev. Rul. 55-277, Int. Rev. Bul. 
1955-19, 22. 
32 Treas. Reg. 105, §81.47a (c), (d). 
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the transfer qualify in the event she is unable to exercise the power? 
In other words, is it the existence of the power or its exercisability 
that determines whether or not the deduction is allowable? 
The code does not spell out the answer to this question. All 
that section 2056 requires is that the power be "exercisable by such 
spouse alone and in all events."33 In the regulations we find an 
amplification of this language, but with no direct answer to our 
inquiry. The regulations state, "The power in the surviving 
spouse is exercisable in all events only if it exists immediately fol-
lowing the decedent's death."34 If our emphasis is correct that all 
that is required is the existence of an unqualified power, then the 
incapacity of the holder of the power would be immaterial. 
This problem was touched upon but evaded by the Tax Court 
in Estate of Frank E. Tingley.35 There the testator had created a 
life estate and power of complete invasion in his widow, subject 
to a condition that her power "shall cease in the case of her legal 
incapacity from any cause or upon the appointment of a guardian, 
conservator, or other custodian of her person or estate." Although 
the widow was at all times mentally responsible, the Commissioner 
challenged the estate's right to deduct the value of this property as 
part of its marital deduction. The Commissioner conceded that 
the test of whether or not the power was "exercisable in all events" 
had to be de~ermined as of the date of the testator's death. But, 
he argued, on that date it was not absolutely certain that the 
widow's power over the corpus was indefeasible. She would lose 
the power if she later became incapacitated or a guardian were 
appointed for her. 
The court avoided a decision on this issue by interpreting the 
testator's language to permit a forfeiture of the widow's power 
under conditions short of legal incapacity. Concerning our prob-
lem, the court stated, 
"If he [ the testator] had referred to legal incapacity alone, 
the situation might well be different . . . [because] any sur-
viving spouse with a power to appoint by will could later lose 
the power . . . [ if she became] legally incapable of writing 
a will exercising the power and Congress may not have in-
tended that such an event by operation of law would deny the 
marital deduction wherever the power was to be by will."36 
38!.R.C., §2056 (b) (5), (6). 
34 Treas. Reg. 105, §81.47a (c). Emphasis added. 
35 22 T.C. 402 at 405 (1954). 
36 Judge Arundel! dissented in a succinct opinion that well summarizes the problem: 
"The mere possibility that she would be deprived of her right to withdraw the property 
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This case did, however, serve the purpose of dramatizing and 
publicizing the problem. As a result when the Commissioner con-
sidered the effect of a person's incompetency under the inclusion of 
property in his estate, he also ruled on the effect of incompetency 
upon the marital deduction. The facts postulated in the ruling 
were these: the surviving spouse had been made the life-time in-
come beneficiary of her husband's trust erected in his will. She was 
also granted a general power of consumption and disposition over 
the trust corpus. But from the time of her husband's death to her 
own demise she was mentally incompetent. Despite the fact that she 
was never actually able to exercise the power granted her, the Com-
missioner ruled (1) that the corpus of the trust was includible in her 
estate, and (2) that the value of the trust property at the time of her 
husband's death qualified for the marital deduction. 
Thus a potential threat of inequality between the two property 
systems was eliminated. Apart from the violence that the ruling 
may do to the literal language of the statute, we believe it clear 
that the ruling is consistent (1) with the theory of equalization, 
and (2) with the underlying principle that property includible in 
the surviving spouse's estate ought to be deductible in the de-
cedent's estate to the extent of one-half thereof. 
4. Effect on Other Traditional Types of Property Settlements. 
At common law a widow was entitled to dower in her husband's 
lands on his death; customarily, dower gave her a life interest in 
one-third of his real property. Similarly, a widower received an 
estate in his wife's lands on her death known as curtesy; this estate 
too consisted of a life interest, but in all, rather than in merely one-
third, of his wife's real property. 
Because both dower and curtesy create no more than a life 
interest in the surviving spouse, both marital estates are disquali-
fied under the terminable interest rule.37 We may find it curious, 
perhaps, that two of the traditional forms of passing property at 
death between husband and wife fail to qualify for the very de-
duction that had been designed to lighten the tax load upon inter-
spouse transfers. This means, of course, that these common law 
forms of marital transfer will pretty well be abandoned by richer 
should she be pronounced legally incompetent does not seem to me a valid reason for 
denying the marital deduction. Such an unfortunate possibility always exists and would 
operate effectively to extinguish the right of any surviving spouse to draw down property 
given with the power to consume or appoint." Id. at 407. 
37 Rev. Rul. 279, 1953-2 Cum. Bul. 275 at 277. 
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families simply because of the economic discrimination against 
them. A premium has been placed upon the writing of a will by 
residents of these states as a result of the discrimination against the 
intestacy forms of transfer. 
U_nder our modem law, both dower and curtesy have been 
replaced by statutory substitutes. If these substitutes create no 
more than a life interest, or interest otherwise terminable, in the 
surviving spouse, then they too will be disqualified from the marital 
deduction.38 On the other hand, a statutory substitute that creates 
a fee interest (or other similar non-terminable interest) in the 
surviving spouse will be deductible.39 
Similarly, under community property rules, the community 
estate is automatically split between the spouses on the death 
of one because of the equal ownership of each spouse in the com-
munity estate. Local property concepts give the estate the same 
break as if the marital deduction were allowable. 
What is the result? Has equalization been achieved? Consider 
for a moment the plight of one who dies intestate. If he had the 
good fortune to live in a community property state, his total com-
munity estate is automatically split with his spouse. If he resided 
in a state that has retained common law dower, his estate loses the 
marital deduction because of the terminable interest rule. If, on 
the other hand, his state of residence provided a statutory substi-
tute for dower that gives his widow a fee interest, the value of the 
property transferred to her is deductible.40 
as Id. at 278 (discussing the Alabama substitute). The same rule is true as to allow-
ances for support under local law. Rev. Rul. 83, 1953-1 Cum. Bul. 395, Rev. Rul. 56-26, 
Int. Rev. Bul. 1956-5, 10; Estate of Nelson, 24 T.C. 30 (1955). 
39 Pitts v. Hamrick, (4th Cir. 1955) 228 F. (2d) 486. See Treas. Reg. 105, §81.47a (b) 
(I) (iii). 
40 Not only is there a difference in result at the time the first spouse dies, but an addi-
tional discrimination occurs when the second dies. Here it appears that the community 
property spouses are worse off. In the absence of a will, the decedent's half of the com-
munity customarily passes to the surviving spouse and will be includible in her estate on 
her death, subject, of course, to a possible credit for the tax levied on the property in the 
prior estate. In a common law dower state, all the property is taxed in the husband's 
estate and none in the wife's. But in the common law substitute states, the husband will 
be entitled to a deduction in his estate for his wife's statutory interest; on her death only 
that interest will be included in her estate. On an oversimplified basis, we might consider 
the following graphic comparison, assuming that the husband dies first. 
% of both spouses' Common law Common law Community 
property included dower substitute property 
In H"s estate 100% 50% 50% 
In W's estate -0- 50% 100% 
Total included 100% 100% 150% 
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This is not equalization. The availability of the marital deduc-
tion depends upon local property concepts, not upon whether or 
not the surviving spouse is the beneficiary of the decedent's estate. 
Because of the terminable interest rule, a decedent in a dower state 
must execute a will in order to gain the benefit of the deduction; 
his brethern in other states may obtain its benefits without writing 
a will, provided their spouses survive them. 
And so we find that a rule, that of the terminable interest, 
designed to equalize the conflicts in· property systems may itself 
be the cause of substantial inequality. 
5. Effect on Annuities. Generally we think of annuities as 
terminable interests. And, as terminable interests, we would ex-
pect to find them disqualified from the marital deduction. And, 
on further reflection, we would agree that this is properly so. After 
all, a husband in a community property state cannot create the 
equivalent of an annuity in his wife's community property which 
she owns outright. But, as we saw above, this test of what a com-
munity property spouse can or can not do is more illusory than real. 
Actually an annuity is deductible or not depending upon 
(I) what its terms are, and (2) who bought it. By this we mean 
to imply that not all annuities are disqualified. In order to de-
termine what types of annuities are deductible, we must retrace 
our steps in analyzing the basic characteristic of a "terminable 
interest." An interest can be considered terminable only if the 
decedent has at some time split his ownership of the property 
passing to the surviving spouse between her and some other per-
son who will take the property after her.41 An annuity is a 
terminable interest only if some interest in it passes to another 
person after the death of the annuitant (in this case the surviving 
spouse). We can imagine two situations in which this condition 
would be present: (1) the surviving spouse's annuity contains a 
refund feature that may be payable to a secondary beneficiary 
on her premature death, or (2) the surviving spouse holds the 
annuity jointly with another who may become the sole annuitant 
as survivor. But if the annuity is payable only to the surviving 
spouse for her life, without refund feature, it is n~t a terminable 
interest. Nor would it be a terminable interest if the surviving 
spouse's interest is that of a survivor annuitant on a joint and 
survivor annuity.42 A refund annuity in favor of the surviving 
41 See discussion, Part B (1) supra. 
42 Treas. Reg. 105, §81.47b (d), example (iv), Bureau Letter, May 12, 1949, P-H Federal 
Tax Service, '1176,258, 1949. 
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spouse may also qualify in the event that the refund is payable 
to her estate, not to any other person.43 In these cases, the surviving 
spouse takes the entire interest in the annuity on the decedent's 
death and no interest in it passes to another person ( other than 
her estate). 
The second part of the test must also be met: who bought the 
annuity is as important for the purpose of the terminable interest 
rule as its type. The two examples of annuities discussed above 
would be deductible only if purchased by the decedent himself. 
If the annuities were bought by his executor out of the liquid 
assets of his estate, the annuity would be disqualified even though 
it is not technically a terminable interest. 
Why this strange result? The short answer is found in the code 
itself.44 Any interest that expires or lapses after a period of time is 
considered non-deductible if purchased by the executor under 
instructions from the decedent. It is immaterial whether or not 
any other person may succeed to the interest after its failure in 
~e hands of the surviving spouse. In other words, interests pur-
chased by an executor under orders from the decedent are sub-
ject to a more restrictive terminable interest rule than those pur-
chased by the decedent himself.45 
What does all of this add up to? First, we see that these rules 
actually permit one to design an interest that is deductible in the 
decedent's estate but yet is not taxable in the surviving spouse's. 
Suppose, for example, a decedent, in a common law state, buys an 
annuity out of his property for his wife. In order to prevent the 
accrual of a gift tax, he retains all the incidents of ownership, in-
cluding the right to surrender, until his death. The annuity falls 
into his gross estate. Because it is not a terminable interest, his 
estate is entitled to deduct it as part of the available marital de-
duction. The annuity, however, expires by its terms on the death 
of his surviving spouse. Hence nothing is includible in her estate 
43 S. Rep. 1013, 80th Cong., 2d sess., 1948-1 Cum. Bul. 285 at 339, 340. But because 
an estate is not a permanent entity, the value of the refund will ultimately inure to the 
benefit of a person other than the surviving spouse; yet the annuity is not deemed to be a 
terminable interest. 
44 I.R.C., §2056 (b) (1) (C). 
45 Treas. Reg. 105, §81.47b (e). Parenthetically we should add that interests purchased 
by an executor under a general direction to sell and invest are not disqualified merely be-
cause they may fail through the lapse of time; only if another person will succeed to the 
interest on such failure will the interests brought under a general power be disqualified. 
This liberalization is, of course, a rephrasing of the more usual terminable interest rule. 
The restrictive rule applies only in the case of a particular direction to the executor to 
purchase an obligation "the discharge of which would • • • have the effect of an annuity 
for life or a term." S. Rep. 1013, 80th Cong., 2d sess., 1948-1 Cum. Bul. 285 at 340. 
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on her death. Thus we can pass property to a surviving spouse 
for her enjoyment without the burden of estate tax.es, either before 
or after the transfer. 46 
Again we must conclude that this is not equalization. Under 
community property concepts, the surviving spouse owns a fee 
interest in her one-half. But under this application of the marital 
deduction formula, she owns only a contract right for installment 
payments that will cease on her death. In a community property 
state only the owner of the property could transmit his interest 
into such an annuity. The husband, for instance, could not con-
vert his wife's one-half share of the community into an annuity 
owned solely by her without her consent.47 Thus, in this area we 
find that qualitative inequality exists between the two property 
systems, despite the adoption of the marital deduction and its 
terminable interest rule. 
6. Effect of the Rule of Strict Construction. The legislative 
exceptions to the terminable interest disqualification48 have been 
strictly construed and applied; by and large it is more common 
for a contested deduction to be denied than to be sustained. And 
in denying the deduction, the courts have been less concerned with 
the underlying philosophy of the marital deduction than they 
have been with maintaining the so-called legislative principle that 
"deductions should be strictly construed against the tax.payer and 
in favor of the sovereign." This attitude, too, has played its part 
in subverting the original purpose of Congress of equalization be-
tween the different property systems.49 
Consider first the exception for a life estate coupled with a 
power of disposition over the corpus. Such a transfer was expressly 
46 The price, of course, is the entire consumption of the property, which may be the 
reason that this device has not appeared more attractive. If the future testator wants to 
conserve any portion of the property, he ·can insert a provision for refund payable to his 
spouse's estate in the event of her premature death. The value of such a refund would 
not prevent the annuity from being deductible in his estate, but it would be includible as 
part of the surviving spouse's estate. 
47 It would require a partition of the community into two separate estates. If the hus-
band purchased an annuity on her life, both he and she would own equal one-half interests 
in it as long as it remained community property. DE FUNIAK, PRINCil'LES OF COMMUNITY 
PROPER.TY §1 (1943). 
48 See discussion at Part B (1) supra. 
49 Perhaps only Congress should be blamed for these discrepancies between theory 
and practice. At any rate, the attitude of the courts and the Commissioner of Internal 
Revenue toward the marital deduction has forced Congress to lead the way in elimi-
nating some of the more glaring errors in the judicial gloss that has been deposited upon 
the marital deduction section since its inception. See §210, Technical Changes Act of 1953, 
67 Stat. L. 615, 624, and compare I.R.C. (1939), §812 (e) (1) (F) and (G) with their counter-
parts, I.R.C. (1954), §2056 {b)(5) and (6). 
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made deductible under the original language of the marital deduc-
tion section, provided the transfer was made in trust.5° Con-
sequently, if the equivalent transfer were made in terms of a legal 
life estate coupled with a power of invasion or disposition over the 
remainder, the transfer was held to be non-deductible, solely be-
cause it was not in trust.51 Whether or not the property would be 
includible in the surviving spouse's estate was 'immaterial; the 
controlling question was whether the transfer was in trust or not 
in trust. 
Interestingly, we find that in ·certain of these cases dealing with 
legal life estates, an argument has been made that the Rule in 
Shelly's Case (or its statutory counterpart) transmutes the surviving 
spouse's life interest plus the power to consume into a fee interest. 
Hence, her interest being an absolute fee, it is deductible. Thus 
far the argument has been rejected, but in each case the rejection 
has been bottomed upon an analysis of local precedent.52 But if 
local law determines this question,53 equalization would be hope-
less of achievement. 
This particular question has been eliminated for estates of 
decedents who die after August 16, 1954. Equalization has been 
obtained by rewriting the federal rule to include this situation. 
Under the provisions of section 2056 of the Internal Revenue Code 
of 1954, an interest, whether legal or equitable, is deductible if a 
life interest and power to appoint the remainder passes to the sur-
viving spouse.54 According to the Senate Report, the amendment 
was required "because of doubt under the law of the various States 
as to what constitutes a 'trust' it is not clear when a legal life estate 
.50 I.R.C. (1939), §812 (e)(l) (F) which reads in part as follows: "In the case of an in-
terest in property passing from the decedent in trust, if under the terms of the trust his 
surviving spouse is entitled for life to all the income from the corpus of the trust ••• with 
the power in the surviving spouse to appoint the entire corpus free of the trust. • • ."' 
:51 Estate of Edward F. Pipe, 23 T.C. 99 at 104 (1954), on appeal to Second Circuit; 
Estate of Michael Melamid, 22 T.C. 966 at 968 (1954); Estate of Frank E. Tingley, 22 
T.C. 402 at 406 (1954), on appeal to First Circuit; Estate of Julius Selling, 24 T.C. 191 at 
197 (1955), acq. on another point Int. Rev. Bul. 1955-40, 6, on appeal to Second Circuit. 
52 Estate of Edward F. Pipe, 23 T.C. 99 at 101 (1954) (New York); Estate of Julius 
Selling, 24 T.C. 191 at 197 (1955) (New York); Estate of Frank E. Tingley, 22 T.C. 402 at 
406 (1954) (Rhode Island); Estate of Harrison P. Shedd, 23 T.C. 41 at 44 (1954), on appeal 
to Ninth Circuit (Arizona). 
53 Under the regulations, the Commissioner has assumed that local law controls this 
question. Treas. Reg. 105, §81.47b (d), example (ii). And in Estate of William Walker 
Wynekoop, 24 T.C. 167 at 171 (1955), acq. Int. Rev. Bul. 1955-47, 6, the Tax Court used 
local law to bail out the estate. 
54 I.R.C., §2056 (b) (5) reads in part as follows: "In the case of an interest in property 
passing from the decedent, if his surviving spouse is entitled for life to all the income 
from the entire interest • . • with power in the surviving_ spouse to appoint the entire 
interest. •. .'' 
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will qualify as a trust."55 One may properly wonder, in view of 
this statement, whether or not the courts that had ruled on the 
matter were right in their decision that only transfers meeting all 
the traditional requirements of a trust would qualify.56 
What of trust transfers themselves? Have the courts been re-
strictive or liberal in applying the statutory language of the marital 
deduction? Again the record forces us to conclude that the courts 
have lost sight of the underlying philosophy of the deduction in 
their search for "jot and tittle" compliance with the statute. 
Perhaps the most common mistake has arisen in the case of a 
testator who wishes to qualify half his estate for the marital deduc-
tion by passing it to his wife and to pass the other half to his chil-
dren subject to a life estate in his wife. Certainly there is nothing 
improper in such a plan and it is common knowledge that this is 
a typical family settlement. But what happens if the testator's 
draftsman fails to state with specificity that the testator intended 
to erect two trusts, one to his wife for life, remainder to children, 
subject to his wife's power of appointment, and the other to his 
wife for life, remainder to children, without a power of appoint-
ment in her? Suppose he just gives her a power of appointment 
over one-half the corpus? Held, no deduction allowable. The 
decedent had intended only one trust; because the surviving spouse 
had been granted a power of appointment over only part of that 
trust, her interest failed to qualify under the statute which requires 
that her power extend to the "entire corpus."57 
Again Congress has had to step in to correct a discrepancy be-
tween theory and practice. Section 2056 of the 1954 code now 
permits a deduction for property transferred to the surviving spouse 
for life, to the extent that she has a power of appointment over the 
55 S. Rep. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d sess., 125 (1954). 
56 In Estate of Edward F. Pipe, 23 T.C. 99 at 102 (1954), this contention was advanced: 
the estate argued that under New York law a life tenant in possession was considered a 
trustee holding the property for the ultimate benefit of the remainderman. The argument 
was rejected in the Pipe case because Mrs. Pipe had been given more than a life estate-
she had the power of disposition and of consumption as well. When you recall that the 
court had already ruled that these additional powers were insufficient to give her a fee, 
you realize that the court was paying only lip service to the concept of integrating the 
husband's and wife's estates to prevent the double inclusion of the property. 
57 Estate of Louis B. Hoffenberg, 22 T.C. 1185 at 1186 (1954), affd. per curiam sub 
nom. Hoffenberg v. Commissioner, (2d Cir. 1955) 223 F. (2d) 470; Estate of Harrison P. 
Shedd, 23 T.C. 41 at 45 (1954) (where the court admitted "substantial compliance" with 
the statute is "no compliance"); Estate of Arthur Sweet, 24 T.C. 488 (1955), on appeal 
to Tenth Circuit; Estate of Frank Clifford Bickers, 14 T.C.M. 901 (1955), T.C. Memo. 
1955-224; Rev. Rul. 54-20, 1954-1 Cum. Bul. 195. 
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remainder. If the life estate and the power reach only part of the 
corpus, the estate's deduction is limited to that part.58 
Both of these trouble spots have been eliminated by corrective 
legislation. But in view of the attitude of the courts, we may 
fairly assume that new areas of controversy will arise. For instance, 
what will be the result if the testator creates but one trust, with a 
life estate in the whole to the surviving spouse but with a power 
of appointment over only one-half the corpus? Will the courts 
deny the deduction of one-half the trust property because the 
surviving spouse's income and power interests are not co-terminous? 
If we consider these cases and the judicial attitude they reflect 
from the viewpoint of equalization, we see that they represent a 
frustration of that objective. We find that in common law states,. 
through inadvertence or error, property is taxed in first the hus-
band's and then the wife's estates. The same situation cannot, 
of course, arise as to community property because the interests of 
the spouses are fixed by law, not by the endeavors of an estate 
draftsman. And these interests control the incidence of federal 
estate taxation. 
C. Elimination of Community Property From the Adjusted 
Gross Estate 
l. Introduction. As a matter of general principle, property 
that is already split between the spouses should not also gain the 
benefit of the marital deduction. If it did, the property would be 
taxed only to the extent of one-fourth of its total value in the dece-
dent's estate; the other three-quarters would not be taxable until 
the death of the surviving spouse.59 Consequently, the statutory 
framework of the deduction provides for the elimination of com-
munity property. 
However, this scheme of elimination is not as simple as it may 
seem. It would be unfair to withhold the deduction completely 
from spouses in community property states because such spouses 
may own property separately as well as in the community form. 
58 I.R.C., §2056 (b) (5): "In the case of an interest ih property passing from the de-
cedent, if his surviving spouse is entitled for life to all the income from the entire interest, 
or all the income from a specific portion thereof . . . with power in the surviving spouse 
to appoint the entire interest, or such specific portion ...• " A similar amendment has 
been made to cover the handling of insurance proceeds. I.R.C., §2056 (b) (6). Cf. Rev. Rul. 
1954-553, 1954-2 Cum. Bui. 303; Estate of Joseph E. Reilly, 25 T.C. No. 46 (1955). 
59 This result would be no worse than that obtaining to a common law husband 
who gives half of his property to his wife before death. He is taxable on only one-quarter, 
and the other three-quarters (less than consumed) are taxed in his wife's estate. 
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And if a husband or wife acquires property separately, it is not 
split between them in ownership as it would be if acquired as 
community property.60 On the death of the owner, separate prop-
erty is included in full in his estate; hence, if no deduction were 
allowable to the owner, he would be unable to split that part of his 
estate with his surviving spouse. In other words, the owner of 
separate property would be placed in the same position as a prop-
erty owner in a common law state prior to the Revenue Act of 1948. 
For this reason the marital deduction was not completely denied 
to the community property states. Instead, the deduction was 
made available in community property states, but on a reduced 
basis. The approach of the statute was to require that all com-
munity property be eliminated from the adjusted gross estate 
limitation placed upon the amount of the deduction. Thus the 
ceiling on the marital deduction allowable was lowered, pro tanto, 
by the value of all community property included in the decedent's 
gross estate. By lowering the ceiling, Congress hoped to eliminate 
the possibility that community property spouses would realize a 
double deduction on the death of the first spouse. 
An example will make the mechanics of this reduction clear. 
Suppose Hand W have amassed a community estate of $400,000. 
On H's death, one-half ($200,000) of this amount is includible in 
his estate. But in order to compute H's adjusted gross estate, H's 
executor must first reduce his gross estate by the amount of com-
munity property included in it.61 -Because the entire estate con-
sists of H's interest in their community property, H's executor must 
reduce the gross estate by itself; consequently, the adjusted gross 
estate is zero and H's estate is entitled to no marital deduction. 
But suppose H had also been possessed of $150,000 of separate 
property, acquired by him from the estate of his father. In this 
case H's estate would total $350,000, including his $200,000 interest 
in the community estate. Again H's executor must reduce the 
gross estate by the amount of community property included in it. 
Thus the $350,000 estate is reduced by $200,000, leaving an ad-
justed gross estate of $150,000. Because the maximum marital 
deduction allowed would be 50 percent of the adjusted gross 
estate, H could pass up to $75,000 to Was a deductible transfer.62 
60 DE FUNIAK, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY §1 (1943). 
61 I.R.C., §2056 (c) (2) (B); Treas. Reg. 105, §81.47d (b). 
62 This illustration has been oversimplified. In addition to the reduction for com-
munity property, H's executor must also reduce H's gross estate by claims, expenses and 
losses. I.R.C., 2056 (c) (2) (A). Because H's community interest is being eliminated in toto 
under another reduction clause, the reduction for claims, expenses and losses is confined 
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One further principle should be kept in mind. It is immaterial 
whether the decedent passes his interest in community property or 
in separate property to his surviving spouse. If he has an adjusted 
gross estate, either type of property passed to his surviving spouse 
will qualify for the marital deduction.63 From a practical stand-
point, this liberalization does no harm, because it is impossible to 
use it to gain a double deduction; all that it accomplishes is to give 
the estate planner in a community property state a greater degree 
of flexibility in deciding which property shall pass to the surviving 
spouse and which shall go to other beneficiaries. But it is only 
when the gross estate includes some separate property that the 
deduction· _is allowable at all. 
'This is the basic approach of the statute; only where separate 
property (or its statutory equivalent) is encompassed in the gross 
estate will any marital deduction be allowable. The statutory 
approach appears fair enough on its face. But, as always, we must 
ask: how has it worked out? 
2. Separate Property Resulting from a Conversion of Com-
munity Property. Because it is normally possible for spouses in a 
community property state to convert their interests in community 
property into separate property, Congress had to engraft a further 
protective device upon the reduction clauses of the adjusted gross 
estate. Otherwise a double deduction could be obtained by the 
simple expedient of converting all of the spouses' community 
property into separate property; then, in the absence of this addi-
tional protective device, the decedent might die leaving an adjusted 
gross estate equal to his separate property and thus qualify for the 
marital deduction an estate that had already been split between the 
spouses through its former community ownership. 
To eliminate this possibility, Congress required that the gross 
estate be reduced by "converted community property," as well as 
by community property, in the process of computing the decedent's 
to only those claims, expenses and losses attributable to non-community property. I.R.C., 
§2056 (c) (2) (B) (iv). For the purpose of deciding which claims, etc., are attributable to 
community property and which to separate property, an arbitrary apportionment is made 
based upon the proportion that· the community property included in the estate bears to 
the entire gross estate. We have the following formula: 
Amount of reduction 
for claims, expenses 
and losses 
Total claims, ex-
penses and losses 
Gross estate less 
community property 
Gross estate 
63 S. Rep. 1013, 80th Cong., 2d sess., 1948-1 Cum. Bui. 285 at 345. 
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adjusted gross estate. By "converted community property" we 
mean any separate property of the decedent that was acquired by 
him in exchange for his interest in community property.64 
Basically, what this device does is to freeze property for the pur-
pose of the marital deduction into community property if it was 
at any time acquired as community property. It makes no dif-
ference how the property may have been transformed or exchanged 
prior to death. Neither a change in form of ownership nor a 
partition of the property will be recognized; if the altered property 
is included in the decedent's gross estate, it must be excluded from 
his adjusted gross estate just as if it retained its character as com-
munity property to the date of his death. 
These principles are pervasive and far-reaching; they exclude 
not only partitioned community property but also newly-acquired 
property purchased with funds derived from property that was 
formerly community property. It is easily possible to conjure 
up situations in which property that never was itself community 
property receives the same treatment as community property under 
these rules.65 Thus the problem of eliminating community prop-
erty from the adjusted gross estate often becomes a nasty problem in 
itself. 
And added to this basic problem are the complications that 
arise in the case of an unequal conversion of community property 
-one in which one spouse gets a larger share than his one-half of 
the community. If such a col?-version were made, the spouse receiv-
ing the larger share would ordinarily be treated as having made a 
gift of one-half of the excess to the other. For the purpose of the 
marital deduction this excess property is treated as true separate 
property in the estate of whichever spouse acquires it; conse-
quently, it need not be eliminated from the adjusted gross estate 
as converted community property.66 
An example may serve to clarify this statutory refinement to 
the concept of converted community property. Suppose H and W 
agree to a conversion of their community property, H taking a car 
64 I.R.C., §2056 (c)(2)(C). • 
65 By way of illustration, consider the case where a husband agrees that his wife's 
earnings are to be her separate property. Suppose W carefully keeps her earnings and does 
not commingle them with community funds in a joint or community bank account. And 
suppose she buys in her own name a car which is her separate property. If she dies first, 
her adjusted gross estate would not include the value of her car because the car had been 
acquired "by the decedent in exchange • • • (for) property held as such community prop• 
erty.'' See Treas. Reg. 105, §81.47 (d) (b). 
66 I.R.C., §2056 ( c) (2) (C) (ii). 
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and stocks worth $20,000, and W holding out for their home worth 
$30,000. If H dies first, all of the property received by him in the 
conversion would be excluded from his adjusted gross estate; he 
received none of the excess and therefore all of his separate property 
was a product of his one-half community interest. But if W dies 
first, a different result obtains. W received $10,000 in excess of 
H's share. Therefore only $20,000 of her interest in the home is 
treated as converted community property; the remainder is treated 
as her separate property and is includible as part of her adjusted 
gross estate. 67 These rules relating to conversions are restricted 
only to the amount of separate property received by the decedent 
in the conversion that is not in excess of the amount received by 
his spouse. 
All of these safeguards, as we have seen, are necessary to carry 
out the basic purpose of equalization. Unless we had these exclu-
sionary rules relating to converted community property, spouses in 
community property states could readily evade the restrictions on 
the use of community property by merely changing the form of 
their holdings from community to separate property. 
But there is still one area into which these conversion rules do 
not reach. If the spouses converted their community ownership 
into separate property prior to January I, 1942, then the property 
is treated as separate property for the purposes of the marital deduc-
tion. 68 In this one situation, the spouses may build up an adjusted 
gross estate out of separate property previously converted from 
community property and thereby pay a tax on only one-quarter 
the entire community estate on the first death. In other words, as 
to this property the equivalent of a "double deduction" is avail-
able.69 
67 If the values of the separate property obtained as a result of the conversion change 
before death, the amount of converted community property and excess separate property 
is determined by applying the ratio that these two types of property bore to one another 
when converted. This conversion ratio is then used to divide the total value at death of 
the property resulting from the original conversion. Treas. Reg. 105, §81.47d (b), example 
(2). See also the example appearing in S. Rep. 1013, 80th Cong., 2d sess., 1948-1 Cum. Bui. 
285 at 345-346. 
68 I.R.C., §2056 ( c) (2) (C) (i). 
69 Under the 1939 code, this "double deduction" of converted community property was 
available not only for conversions occurring before January 1, 1942, but also for conversions 
made in the period January 1, 1943 to April 2, 1948. I.R.C. (1939), §812 (e) (2) (C) (i). This 
supplementary period of grace was stricken out of the Revenue Act of 1954 as introduced 
in bill form in the House of Representatives. See H.R. 8300, §2056, 83d Cong., 2d sess. 
(1954). No explanation for dropping the supplementary period was given in the Com-
mittee Report, H. Rep. 1337, 83d Cong, 2d sess., A319 (1954). The explanation may lie, 
however, in the adoption of the Revenue Service of the theory of Commissioner v. Mills, 
(9th Cir. 1950) 183 F. (2d) 32. There the court invalidated a treasury regulation that 
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To this extent, at least, we find that the reduction clauses are 
not accomplishing full parity between the two systems of owner-
ship. The disparity, however, is diminishing because the cut-off 
date, January 1, 1942, is receding year by year and the amount of 
property qualifying for this special benefit is steadily diminishing . 
. This special advantage cannot, of course, be obtained for any new 
community property owners who were not already entitled to it 
on January 1, 1942. 
3. Exceptions to the Reduction for Community Property 
Clauses. Not all community property falls under these rules out-
lined above. According to the code, only community property 
that is split between the spouses for federal estate tax purposes 
must be eliminated from the adjusted gross estate;70 other types of 
community property are included as part of the adjusted gross 
estate just as separate property is included.71 
The regulations have restated this test positively to permit the 
inclusion in the decedent's adjusted gross estate of any community 
property "in which the surviving spouse had at such time merely 
an expectant interest."72 The most prominent illustration of this 
type of property is "pre-'27" community property in California. 
Prior to July 29, 1927, a California wife had not much more than 
an expectancy in community property; she had to survive her hus-
band to take her one-half. Hence, when the husband died, the 
entire community was included in his gross estate for estate tax 
purposes.73 Because the entire property is included in the hus-
band's gross estate, it all qualifies for his adjusted gross estate.74 
purported to treat all conversions of community property into separate property as tax-
able gifts of the husband if made after December 31, 1941 and prior to the Revenue Act of 
1948. See Treas. Reg. 108, §86.2 (c). If these conversions were no longer to be treated as 
gifts when made, the reason for giving them special treatment under the marital deduction 
reduction clauses disappeared. See T.D. 6015, 1953-1 Cum. Bul. 396. 
70 I.R.C., §2056 (c) (2) (B), which reads in part: "For purposes of clauses (i), (ii), and 
(iii), community property ••• shall be considered as not 'held as such community property' 
as of any moment of time, if, in the case of the death of the decedent at such moment, 
such property (and not merely one-half thereof) would be or would have been includible 
in determining the value of his gross estate. . . ." 
71 With the exception, of course, of property which traces its ancestry to community 
property of a type that is split between the spouses; such converted community property 
is treated the same as the property from which it is descended. 
72 Treas. Reg. 105, §81.47d (b) (i). 
73 Talcott v. United States, (9th Cir. 1928) 23 F. (2d) 897 at 901, cert. den. 277 U.S. 
604, 48 S.Ct. 601 (1928); T.D. 3891, V-2 Cum. Bul. 232 (1926). California has since 
amended her statutes to grant a wife "a present, existing and equal interest" in com-
munity property during her lifetime. Cal. Civ. Code (West, 1954) §16la. 
74 S. Rep. 1013, 80th Cong., 2d sess., 1948-1 Cum. Bul. 285 at 345. 
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From the viewpoint of equalization, we cannot quarrel ~ith this 
result. This particular type of community property is treated in 
the same manner as property in common law states both for the 
purpose of inclusion in the gross estate and of qualifying for the 
marital deduction. 
The other side of the coin presents the other basic exception 
· to these community property rules. Suppose the wife dies first in 
a state in which her community interest is a mere expectancy. She 
forfeits her interest on death. Hence no part of the community 
estate is taxable in her gross estate. And, naturally, no part of the 
property would qualify for the marital deduction.75 
Again we cannot quarrel with the result; it seems entirely con-
sistent with the treatment of common law property. On the other 
hand, what we said in criticism of the equalization between com-
mon law and community property systems when the wife dies first 
applies equally well here. As to "pre-'23" California and as to 
New Mexico community property, the death of the wife causes no 
tax liability to accrue. Contrast this with the case of ordinary 
community property; on the wife's death, one-half of the com-
munity estate is taxable in her gross estate. 
But other complications may also ensue. It is even possible 
for conflicting results to obtain in one community property state 
as to the same property. For example, in 1923, California wives 
were given a power of disposition over their half interests in the 
community estate.76 This power was sufficient to require the 
inclusion of a wife's community interest in her estate if she died 
first. But if her husband died first, the entire community estate 
was included in his gross estate.77 
The application of the principles of the reduction clauses may 
lead to the curious result that certain property will qualify for the 
marital deduction in one spouse's estate, but not in· the other's! 
These cross-currents in the community property system create 
75 This apparently is the situation in New Mexico. Hernandez v. Becker, (10th Cir. 
1931) 54 F. (2d) 542. But see the acidulous comments of Robert Emmet Clark in "An-
other Community Property Anomaly,'' 11 TAX L. REv. 76 at 82 (1955) on this decision. 
Until recently, it was the rule in Nevada. In 1955, however, the Commissioner reversed 
his original ruling to take the position that one-half of the community estate is taxable on 
the wife's death. Rev. Ru!. 55-605, Int. Rev. Bul. 1955-40, 10. And prior to 1923, when 
the wife was granted a power of disposition over her half, it must have been the rule in 
California. 
76 1923 Stat. L. (California), c. 18, p. 29. 
77 See authorities cited in note 73 supra. 
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situations where there is no more equalization among the com-
munity property states themselves than there is between community 
property and common law property. 
4. Conclusion. By and Jarge the rules relating to the treat-
ment of community property under the marital deduction have 
achieved the result of preventing a double deduction. To that 
extent at least, these rules have accomplished equalization. But 
other aspects of this treatment leave us more dubious. The rules 
relating to separate property result in equating separate property 
with common law property under the deduction. Thus, the same 
types of discrimination that exist between common law and com-
munity property are extended to community and separate property. 
On the other hand, nothing is done to lessen or to eliminate these 
disparities as to community property itself. 
In other words, we can sum up the community property pro-
visions of the marital deduction by saying that they eliminate the 
possibility of reducing. the first spouse's estate to one-quarter of 
the total. The same possibility has not, however, been eliminated 
in common law states. There a spouse may confidently give away 
half his estate before death and still qualify for the full marital 
deduction when he dies. These provisions obviously leave much 
to be desired. 
D. Problems of Planning for Administration 
I. Introduction. Several problems arise in the planning of 
an estate for administration on the death of the testator that may 
give rise to inequalities between the two property systems. Among 
these problems are the questions (1) of how the estate tax is to be 
apportioned among the beneficiaries of the estate, (2) of the 
manner in which the surviving spouse's share will be treated under 
concepts of local probate administration, (3) of the local death 
duties payable on the surviving spouse's share, and (4) of the 
property to be selected for transfer to the surviving spouse for her 
enjoyment after the testator's death. 
2. Who Pays the Tax? One anomaly that has appeared in 
the administration of the marital deduction is the problem of who 
bears the burden of the estate tax on the decedent's estate: all of 
the beneficiaries of his estate? Or all beneficiaries other than the 
surviving spouse if her legacy is tax deductible? 
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Naturally this is no problem under community property con-
cepts. The surviving spouse takes her one-half share undiminished 
by a levy for any share of the estate tax on her husband's half in-
terest. She owned her community interest prior to the decedent's 
death and her interest does not fall into his gross estate.78 
But in common law states the problem is a perennial one. It 
arises out of the statutory language of the marital deduction itself. 
Section 2056 specifically requires that "there shall be taken into 
account the effect which the (federal estate tax) . . . or any 
estate, succession, legacy, or inheritance tax, has on the net value 
of the surviving spouse of ... (the interests passing to her and 
qualifying for the deduction)."79 
As a matter of basic interpretation, what this proviso does is 
to reduce the amount of any marital transfer by the amount of 
any federal or state tax chargeable to the property passing from 
the decedent to his spouse. Naturally, if the amount of property 
transferred to the spouse exceeds the maximum marital deduction 
by the amount of the tax, this subsection makes no difference; the 
amount of the marital transfer, even after reduction for taxes, still 
exceeds the maximum amount deductible. Hence the full marital 
deduction, equal to one-half the adjusted gross estate, is deductible. 
But in any case in which the property transferred to the surviv-
ing spouse is about equal to, or is less than, the maximum deduct-
ible, the amount of federal and state taxes apportioned to the 
spouse's share of the estate will reduce her share; consequently, the 
amount deductible is also reduced. An example may make this 
clear: suppose H dies leaving a taxable estate of $500,000, passing 
$250,000 to W, all of which qualifies for the marital deduction. 
But a state inheritance tax of $10,000 is levied against the transfer 
to her. Under this subsection, the amount of the marital deduction 
is reduced from $250,000 to $240,000, which is equal to the net 
amount passed to her. 
In the case of the federal estate tax, which is a tax payable out 
of the entire estate, not a charge against a specific legacy, the testa-
78 This result occurs even in the case where the surviving spouse elects to have her 
community interest administered in her spouse's estate for probate purposes. Estate of 
Buckhantz, 120 Cal. App. (2d) 92, 260 P. (2d) 794 (1953). Compare Estate of Cushing, 
ll3 Cal. App. (2d) 319, 248 P. (2d) 482 (1952), which dealt with the analogous prob-
lem of computing the state inheritance tax on the decedent's community estate if he 
leaves his entire community interest to his surviving spouse. 
79 I.R.C., §2056 (b) (4) (A). See S. Rep. 1013, 80th Cong., 2d sess., 1948-1 Cum. Bul. 
285 at 335. 
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tor may control its payment by will. He can, if he wishes, have 
property other than that passing to his spouse bear the primary 
responsibility for the tax. The effect will be to protect the marital 
legacy from reduction for taxes; consequently, the marital deduc-
tion available to his estate will not be reduced for any share of the 
taxes. 
If he fails to provide expressly for the payment of taxes, the 
general rule, in the absence of a state statute, is that the federal 
estate tax is payable out of the residual estate.80 Where the marital 
transfer is made a part of the residuary share, the marital deduction 
may be reduced by the entire amount of the estate tax payable on 
the entire estate; and because the marital deduction is decreased, 
the amount of estate tax liability incurred will be increased.81 
This result occurs whenever the amount of the surviving spouse's 
residual share is less than the maximum marital deduction plus 
estate taxes. To prevent this result, the testator must either pro-
vide for apportionment of the tax liability in his• will or forego 
the use of a residual bequest to his spouse.82 
In certain jurisdictions we find that specific apportionment 
statutes have been enacted. These statutes direct that the federal 
estate tax burden be apportioned among the beneficiaries of the 
estate according to their respective shares in the estate, ''except that 
in making such proration allowances shall be made for any exemp-
tion granted by the act imposing the tax and for any deductions 
allowed by such act for the purpose of arriving at the value of the 
net estate .... "83 
so Harrison v. Northern Trust Co., 317 U.S. 476, 63 S.Ct. 361 (1943). 
81 See Miller v. Hammond, 156 Ohio St. 475, 104 N.E. (2d) 9 (1952), where the estate 
represented to the court that an apportionment of the estate tax burden to the widow's 
share of the estate would so decrease the marital deduction that the overall federal es-
tate tax burden would be increased $50,0001 The court held for the widow on this argu-
ment and charged her share with no part of the federal estate tax burden despite the 
fact that Ohio had no apportionment statute. The case was subsequently overruled in 
Campbell v. Lloyd, 162 Ohio St. 203, 122 N.E. (2d) 695 (1954), cert. den. 349 U.S. 9ll, 
75 S.Ct. 600 (1955). In Wachovia Bank &: Trust Co. v. Green, 236 N.C. 654,. 73 S.E. (2d) 
879 (1953), the difference in the tax was over $265,000, and In re Uihlein's Will, 264 Wis. 
362, 59 N.W. (2d) 641 (1953), about $415,000. 
82 See Estate of Rosalie Cahn Morrison, 24 T.C. 965 (1955), where, simply because 
the transfer was not made in the residuary estate, the Commissioner lost his battle to re-
duce the marital transfer by a part of the federal estate tax burden. And see Baylor v. 
Nat. Bank of Commerce, 194 Va. 1, 72 S.E. (2d) 282 (1952), where the testator had made 
express provision for apportionment in his will. 
83 This is the language of §124.1 of the New York Decedent's Estate Law (McKinney, 
1949) before the 1950 amendments to it; the pre-1950 language served as the model for 
most of the other apportionment statutes. The 1950 version of the act was more specific, 
providing that "any exemption or deduction allowed under the law imposing the tax by 
1124 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [ Vol. 54 
This language has not given the courts any particular compass 
bearing in reaching a decision as to whether or not the marital 
transfer should be assigned a portion of the federal levy. The 
cases under it are conflicting. On the one hand, it has provided 
sufficient justification for freeing the surviving spouse's share from 
any part of the estate tax burden; the theory expressed by the courts 
reaching this result is that because the surviving spouse's share has 
not contributed to the estate tax burden (it being deductible), it 
need not contribute to the tax burden levied on the estate.84 
But, on the other hand, this is not the sole interpretation. Other 
courts have held that the language requires no more than a straight 
pro rata apportionment of the net estate tax burden among the 
various beneficiaries; exemptions and deductions are to be taken 
into account only to determine the tax.able estate; whatever tax 
results from that determination is made a charge against each bene-
ficiary according to his share in ~e total estate. 85 
Because of the substantial difference in tax results, litigants in 
states not having an apportionment statute are urging their courts 
to adopt a judicially created rule of apportionment. To a very 
limited extent this approach has succeeded.86 But by and large 
the courts have refused to apply any rule of "equitable apportion-
ment." These latter courts reason that the absence of a specific 
apportionment statute is almost conclusive evidence that the doc-
trine of apportionment is not the law of the jurisdiction.87 
reason of the relationship of any person to the decedent ..• shall inure to the benefit 
of such person bearing such relationship .••• " N.Y. Decedent's Estate Law (McKinney, 
1949; Supp. 1955) §124(3). 
84 In re Peter's Will, 88 N.Y.S. (2d) 142 (1949), affd. per curiam 275 App. Div. 950, 
89 N.Y.S. (2d) 651, appears to be the grandfather of this theory. Accord: In re Wolf's 
Estate, 307 N.Y. 280, 121 N.E. (2d) 224 (1954); Jerome v. Jerome, 139 Conn. 285, 93 A. 
(2d) 139 (1952); In re Rosenfield's Estate, 376 Pa. 42, 101 A. (2d) 684 (1954); Estate of 
Buckhantz, 120 Cal. App. (2d) 92, 260 P. (2d) 794 (1953); In re Fuch's Estate, (Fla. 1952) 
60 S. (2d) 539. 
85 Weinberg v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co. of Baltimore, 198 Md. 539, 85 A. (2d) 50 
(1951); Williamson v. Williamson, (Ark. 1954) 272 S.W. (2d) 72. 
86 Lincoln Bank & Trust Co. v. Huber, (Ky. 1951) 240 S.W. (2d) 89; Pitts v. Hamrick, 
(4th Cir. 1955) 228 F. (2d) 486 (applying a decision of South Carolina probate court); 
Weyenberg v. United States, (D.C. Wis. 1955) 135 F. Supp. 299 (applying a Wisconsin 
probate court decision); and see Miller v. Hammond, 156 Ohio St. 475, 104 N.E. (2d) 9 
(1952), subsequently overruled. 
87 Northern Trust Co. v. Wilson, 344 Ill. App. 508, 101 N.E. (2d) 604 (1951); In re 
Uihlein's Will, 264 Wis. 362, 59 N.W. (2d) 641 (1953); Moorman v. Moorman, 340 Mich. 
636, 66 N.W. (2d) 248 (1954); Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Green, 236 N.C. 654, 73 S.E. 
(2d) 879 (1953); Campbell v. Lloyd, 162 Ohio St. 203, 122 N.E. (2d) 695 (1954), cert. den. 
349 U.S. 911, 75 S.Ct. 600 (1955). 
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This discussion points to the obvious conclusion that there is 
no uniformity among the states in regard to the sharing of the estate 
tax load by the surviving spouse. And, consequently, there is no 
uniformity in whether or not the available marital deduction is 
to be reduced for a share of the estate taxes. Uniformity in prac-
tice is attainable only by making express provision in the dece-
dent's will.88 
In one apportionment area, at least, we thought uniformity 
had been achieved. That area pertains to the right of an executor 
to obtain contribution for a share of the estate tax burden from 
beneficiaries who have received property from the decedent out-
side the probate estate but in such manner that the property falls 
into the decedent's gross estate for federal estate tax purposes. For 
instance, in the case of life insurance beneficiaries, the Internal 
Revenue Code expressly creates a right of contribution, making the 
insurance beneficiary liable to the estate for a pro rata share of the 
federal estate burden, except that "this section shall not apply to 
such proceeds (received by a surviving spouse) except as to the 
amount thereof in excess of the aggregate amount of the marital 
deduction allowed. . . ."89 The same rule of contribution exists 
in favor of the estate against persons who receive property because 
of a power held by the decedent in such manner as to include the 
property in his gross estate.90 
A fair inference to be drawn from this language is that a surviv-
ing spouse's share is exempt from making a contribution to the 
extent that her share is deductible and therefore did not contribute 
88 This was the answer given by the dissenters in Miller v. Hammond, 156 Ohio St. 
475, 104 N.E. (2d) 9 at 19 (1952). If the testator wants equality with community property 
states he can obtain it merely by so providing in his will; and, the dissenters went on 
to point out, the testator doesn't have the disadvantage inherent in community property: 
he is not required to give his surviving spouse as much property as she is entitled to under 
community property laws! As a matter of estate draftsmanship, we might point out the 
most advantageous tax apportionment clause is one that would not only protect the 
marital deduction but also eat into any part of the marital transfer in excess of the 
deduction. The reason for this conclusion should be obvious: any transfer to the surviving 
spouse in excess of the amount deductible will be taxed in both the decedent's and the 
surviving spouse's estates before passing to the second generation beneficiaries. There• 
fore, rather than have this excess amount transferred to the surviving spouse, you may 
find it more economical to apply it to the payment of estate taxes on the decedent's estate. 
In order to achieve this end, you might provide a tax apportionment clause that would 
apportion the estate tax first to the share of the surviving spouse to the extent, and only 
to the extent, that it exceeds the maximum marital deduction allowable. The remainder 
of the estate tax would be apportioned pro rata to all other beneficiaries. 
89 I.R.C., §2206. 
90 I.R.C., §2207; in both cases, the right of contribution may be waived by the de• 
cedent in his will. 
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to the measure of the tax. But this is not the interpretation placed 
upon the section by one of the probate courts that has ruled on 
the matter. 
In Weinberg v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co. of Baltimore,91 the 
court took the position that the federal statute was intended to 
apply only to insurance proceeds payable to a surviving spouse in 
excess of the deductible amount. Hence, as to the amount qualify-
ing for the marital deduction, the federal provision did not apply . 
and the local apportionment statute governed. Because the court 
had already interpreted its o,vn apportionment statute to require 
contribution of a pro rata share of federal estate taxes from a sur-
viving spouse's share even when deductible, the wife's share of the 
insurance proceeds was also subject to contribution. The fact 
that the entire amount had been a deductible amount in the dece-
dent's gross estate was immaterial. 
Thus, we are furnished with an example of the projection of 
local inequalities, arising out of local law, into an area for which 
Congress had attempted to legislate a uniform rule. It would be 
hard to find a better example of the extreme difficulties of writing 
a uniform rule of equalization for application among the several 
states and their varied property systems. 
3. Double Probate Expenses and Death Duties. As those who 
practice in common law states know, the marital deduction is not 
an unmixed blessing. In practice the theoretical saving provided 
by the use of the maximum deduction is often not realized in full 
measure. One reason for this is the presence of local fees, taxes 
and expenses that are levied on the probate of an estate. Com-
pare, for example, these charges on a marital deduction type of 
settlement versus a life estate remainder over settlement. At the 
time of the decedent's death probate fees and death duties are in-
curred on the entire estate. If the property is given outright to the 
surviving spouse, a second round of probate fees and death duties 
will be levied on the property on her death. 
On the other hand, had the testator foregone the saving of a mar-
ital deduction transfer, he might have saved the second levy of fees 
and taxes by creating only a life estate in the surviving spouse; 
hence, on her death there would be no property in her estate to 
administer because the remainder interest in the property has al-
91 198 Md. 539, 85 A. (2d) 50 (1951). 
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ready been transferred directly to the second generation bene-
ficiaries.92 Thus the saving in fees and taxes must, in many cases, 
be considered as an offset to the saving of the marital deduction and 
must be borne in mind in determining how desirable the deduc-
tion actually is. 
A number of states have eliminated this problem in regard to 
taxes by providing for a marital deduction modeled upon the 
federal prototype.93 In such a jurisdiction there would be no 
doubling of state taxes because presumably a transfer that qualifies 
for the federal deduction would also qualify for the state marital 
deduction. The problem of double costs of administration would 
still exist even in these jurisdictions, however. 
What we have said about the possible offsetting loss for double 
taxes and expenses under a marital deduction transfer does not 
apply to community property estates. In the latter case each 
spouse's community interest bears its own taxes and costs of ad-
ministration. Each spouse's interest is treated as his own estate 
on his death; the interest of the surviving spouse is not administered 
in the estate of the decedent and suffers no diminution for taxes 
and expenses until it is probated on the subsequent death of its 
owner.94 
To this extent, then, a saving in costs and local taxes is available 
to community property spouses that may be denied to their counter-
parts under the common law system. So long as the terminable 
interest rule forces the decedent to leave his property to the sur-
viving spouse in such fashion that it will fall into her estate on her 
death, this disparity will exist. 
92 This statement is not intended to imply that the price for escaping a second round 
of costs of administration and death duties is the loss of the marital deduction. An astute 
estate planner working within the framework of a given jurisdiction can frequently figure 
out transfers that will accomplish both results. We are also ignoring the costs of termi-
nating a life tenancy of record under local procedure. 
93 Without attempting to be all-inclusive, we find that at least two states (New York 
and North Dakota) have made provision for a marital deduction: N.Y. Tax Law (Mc-
Kinney, 1954) §249-s; N.D. Rev. Code (Supp. 1953) §57-3711 (2). Similarly, California 
exempts 50% of the decedent's separate property, if that amount is transferred to his 
surviving spouse. Cal. Revenue and Taxation Code (Deering, 1952) §13805. 
94 Invariably, it seems we must recoguize an exception. In many community property 
states, as in the case of the widow's election discussed above, the surviving spouse may elect 
to have her community interest administered in her husband's estate. In this case, it would 
bear a pro rata share of the costs of administration, but not of taxes. However, on her 
subsequent death, a separate administration of her community interest would not be neces-
sary. 
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4. Choice of Assets. As we have pointed out previously, the 
community interests of husband and wife are equal undivided inter-
ests in all the property held by them in community ownership. 
Neither spouse can pick and choose which specific community 
assets he wishes to own for himself; if he makes an effort to do so 
and obtains his spouse's consent to his sole ownership, he effects 
a conversion of the community ownership of the property into 
separate ownership. This conversion would be accomplished 
either by way of gift or exchange, depending upon the circum-
stances. 
But their counterparts under the common law system labor in 
no such strait jacket.95 In framing a marital deduction bequest, 
a spouse at common law is fairly free in his will to make whatever 
selection of assets he wishes between his marital bequest and other 
settlements. The proper use of this power to select is an important 
function of the estate planner in framing a marital deduction 
bequest most advantageously for his clients. A short discussion 
of these points will make this advantage clear. 
First, as a general rule the testator should segregate his wasting 
assets and place them in the marital deduction transfer. By 
"wasting assets" is meant such properties as annuities, patents, copy-
rights, mineral leases, leaseholds, life estates (per autre vie), estates 
for years, insurance renewal commissions, etc., none of which are 
technically terminable interests in themselves.96 These assets will 
be deductible in the decedent's gross estate at their full value as of 
the date of death or the date of optional valuation, whichever is 
selected. But because these assets are wasting, they may have dis-
appeared completely on the death of the surviving spouse or else 
have become substantially depreciated in value. Hence little or 
nothing will be included in her estate and the family unit may 
escape estate taxation on them. What greater advantage could 
one desire? 
Second, in the process of selecting assets for the marital bequest, 
the testator should keep in mind the income tax consequences of his 
95 Again we must point out a possible area of disagreement with the statement in the 
text. In most states a surviving widow is given an election to take against the will if she 
feels her husband has not treated her generously in his will. And her interests in his 
estate, assertable by her under such an election, would be analogous to a community 
spouse's interest in the community estate. It would reach all the assets equally and be 
an undivided interest therein until the date of partition by order of the probate court 
setting aside specific assets in satisfaction qf her statutory interest. 
96 See discussion, Part B, 1 supra. 
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selection. For example, if his surviving spouse already possesses 
sufficient income to take care of her needs, he should refrain from 
giving her additional high income-producing properties. The tax 
rate on the income from these properties may virtually nullify the 
benefit of the bequest to her. Hence he may be well advised to 
s.elect assets that produce little or no income for transfer to her. 
Among these would be works of art, personal objects, personal 
automobiles, the family home (none of which produces income), 
or income properties that produce high deductions to offset in-
come, such as oil investments (depletion) or hotels (depreciation). 
Third, assets should be selected with an eye to their treatment 
under state inheritance tax laws. If exemptions or exclusions are 
provided for certain types of properties, such as insurance proceeds, 
assets of this nature, such as insurance policies, should be trans-
ferred to the surviving spouse; on her subsequent death, these 
assets will then qualify for the exemption and not suffer diminu-
tion through a second levy of inheritance taxes. 
These are advantages available to an estate planner that he may 
properly make use of in framing an estate plan in the best interests 
of his clients. Such planning has become, for obvious reasons, an 
integral part of marital deduction planning. It has, however, no 
counterpart in community property planning and to that extent 
represents a substantial advantage over the concepts of community 
estates. 
IL EQUALIZATION UNDER THE FEDERAL GIFT TAX 
A. Statutory Framework 
The federal gift tax imposes a tax upon all gifts made by a 
person to another; the rate of tax imposed is progressive, rising 
from 2¼ percent on the first $5,000 of taxable gifts to a maximum 
rate of 57¾ percent. The rate is roughly three-quarters of the 
estate tax rate for the equivalent brackets. 
Provision was made in the Revenue Act of 1948 to permit 
spouses to elect to split gifts made by one of them to a third party 
between themselves for the purpose of computing the tax on the 
gifts; this provision was introduced for the purpose of equalizing 
the tax treatment of gifts made from a spouse's separate property 
with that accorded to gifts made from community property.97 
97 I.R.C., §2513. See H. Rep. 1274, 80th Cong., 2d sess., 1948-1 Cum. Bul. 241 at 260-261. 
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Provision was also made for gifts inter spouse. In community 
property states each spouse is presumed to have contributed equally 
to the acquisition of compunity property; hence the creation of 
equal undivided interests in community property is not created as 
a taxable gift by one spouse to another. Consequently, the 
Revenue Act of 1948 attempted to duplicate in common law states 
this tax-free splitting of community property by providing for a 
tax-deductible method of transferring interests between spouses.98 
The device used was to write the concept of a marital deduction 
into the federal gift tax. 
Section 2523 of the code permits a person who makes a gift to 
his spouse to deduct half its value from the measure of the amount 
of the gift for tax purposes. In other words, if a husband transfers 
$100,000 to his wife by gift, in a common law state he need treat 
only $50,000 of it as a taxable gift. 
The section also contains a disqualification provision for term-
inable interests; the marital deduction allowable on a gift is for-
feited if the donee's interest is one that may shift from her to an-
other on the occurrence of a condition. Exceptions to the termin-
able interest disqualification are provided for property transfers 
that are substantially the equivalent of a fee interest." And, finally, 
gifts of community property are excluded from the benefits of the 
deduction.99 All of these qualifying sections bear marked re--
semblance to their counterparts under the estate tax marital deduc- · 
tion and, in large part, our discussion concerning the estate tax 
provisions is applicable equally as well to the gift tax marital deduc-
tion. 
B. Lifetime Splitting Under the Gift Tax Marital Deduction 
That this formula for equalizing the two property systems under 
the gift tax is unsuccessful should be apparent. There is a tre-
mendous pressure on an estate planner in a common law state to 
suggest a program of inter vivos gifts between the spouses in any 
~ase in which one spouse owns considerably more property than 
the other. If the richer spouse dies first, the esta_te planner can 
turn to the estate tax marital deduction and thus split the estate 
between the spouses for estate tax purposes. But if the poorer 
spouse dies first, the estate planner finds that the bulk of the estate 
98 S. Rep. IOHI, 80th Cong., 2d sess., 1948-1 Cum. Bul. 285 at 351. 
99 I.R.C., §2523 (b), (e), and (f). 
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is in the hands of the surviving spouse who has now forfeited the 
opportunity of utilizing the marital deduction unless he remarries. 
And so, if he could, the estate planner would like to transfer part 
of the richer spouse's estate to the poorer prior to death in order 
to split the estate for estate tax purposes regardless of which spouse 
dies first. 
But the price for making these gifts is a gift tax. The marital 
deduction under the gift tax is available only for half the property 
given to the poorer spouse; the other half is a taxable transfer. And 
weighing in the scales against these proposed lifetime gifts is the 
knowledge that the richer spouse can transfer one-half of his net 
estate to the poorer spouse completely tax-free on his death. Any 
gift tax previously paid on a transfer to the poorer spouse becomes 
an unnecessary expenditure if the richer spouse dies first.100 
If lifetime splitting cannot be accomplished between spouses 
without incurring a tax liability, there is obviously no equality 
between the common law and community property systems under 
the federal gift tax. 
C. Gifts to Others 
Faced with this situation, the estate planner usually finds his 
solution to lie in encouraging gifts by the richer spouse directly 
to the secondary beneficiaries, by-passing his spouse. By such a 
program, the richer spouse can reduce the discrepancy between 
his own and his spouse's estates. The loss of the marital deduction 
to him will thus be much less severe if the poorer spouse dies first. · 
And here, unlike the situation under the gift tax marital deduc-
tion, the richer spouse may take advantage of the split-gift provi-
sions without forfeiting other advantages he may have under the 
estate tax marital deduction. In this situation he is treated just 
like his counterpart in a community property state who makes gifts 
from the community property.101 
III. CONCLUSION 
We believe it is abundantly clear that the marital deduction has 
fallen short of its goal of equalization. On the quantitative side, 
100 See the discussion in Part I, B, 4 supra. Neither the credit for gift taxes (§2012) 
nor the credit for prior transfers (§2013) would be available to the estate of the poorer 
spouse on her subsequent death because she is the donee of the gifts. Nor are these 
credits available to the richer spouse, unless, in the case of the former, the gifts fall into 
the richer spouse's gross estate for estate tax purposes. 
101 See the discussion in Part I, B, 5 supra. 
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the major disparity grows out of the fact that the marital deduction 
is a function of only one spouse's estate, not of the total estate of 
both spouses (as in the case of community property splitting). 
And from the qualitative viewpoint, we find that even more dis-
crepancies exist, brought about in part by the ingenuity of estate 
planners. A technical rule of disqualification, such as the term-
inable interest rule, is an open invitation for the design of plans that 
fall just outside the proscribed limits but within the rule's purpose. 
Because the approach may have been unwise does not mean 
that the policy underlying the marital deduction is erroneous. 
But the marital deduction formula needs much greater revision 
than it received in 1954. 
As a matter of ultimate social policy, we believe that it is hard 
to quarrel with the thesis that a man's estate and his earnings 
ought to be available to his spouse after his death without diminu-
tion for estate taxes. Perhaps this belief is an outgrowth and 
natural product of the community property system itself. A wife 
shares and contributes to the building up of her husband's accu-
mulations equally as much in a common law jurisdiction as under 
community property rules. And, if this is true, it seems unfair to 
reduce the amount of these accumulations to which she has con-
tributed by way of a tax on her husband's death. For these reasons 
the policy of the marital deduction has much to commend it. 
But can such a policy be implemented by a statutory frame-
work that will achieve equalization? Perhaps. One method 
would be to provide a complete exemption from estate and gift 
tax for all interspousal transfers. This is a suggestion that has been 
made frequently in the past and its adoption appears to be as remote 
as ever.102 
Another suggestion for improvement would be to adopt a 
series of amendments to the present marital deduction formula. 
The first of these, we believe, ought to be to get rid of the qualita-
tive restrictions on the types of transfer that qualify for the deduc-
tion. In other words, the terminable interest rule, which has 
caused so much grief and misunderstanding, should be eliminated, 
if for no other reason than the fact that its restrictions can readily 
be avoided both in common law and community property jurisdic-
tions. 
102Surrey, "Federal Taxation of the Family-The Revenue Act of 1948," 61 HARv. L. 
REv. 1097 at 1161 (1948). 
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Coupled with this relief must obviously be a provision designed 
to catch the property in the surviving spouse's estate if it is deduct-
ible in the decedent's estate. Under the existing rule which 
exempts a remainder interest from taxation in the life tenant's 
estate, the terminable interest rule is essential in order to prevent 
wholesale tax avoidance. But if the rule is revised, or if a condi-
tion is attached to the deduction that the surviving spouse agree 
to report the value of the remainder in her estate, this difficulty 
would be eliminated. At any rate, an amendment of the rules 
relating to the taxation of life tenants must go hand in hand with 
any relaxation of the terminable interest rule. 
Turning to the quantitative inequalities that presently exist 
under the marital deduction formula, we believe that the best hope 
for equality lies in the correlation of the estate and gift taxes into 
one over-all transfer tax pattern. In other words, gifts by living 
persons should be treated as part of a person's ultimate estate 
plan, which in many cases they really are. A tax would be levied 
on these gifts as a prepayment of the ultimate estate tax due. 
Basically, what we are trying to do is to permit an owner of 
common law property to transfer one-half of it to his spouse tax-free, 
whether the transfers are during life or at death. The available 
marital deduction would be exhausted either by inter vivos gifts 
or by bequests at death. To the extent that gifts during life had 
been made under the deduction, the amount of the deduction 
allowable at death would be correspondingly reduced. 
And, finally, to accomplish complete equality, we would find 
it necessary to make the deduction a function of the total estate 
of both spouses.103 The amount of the deduction would no longer 
be one-half of the decedent's adjusted gross estate, but it would be 
one-half of the total of the decedent's estate plus his spouse's prop-
erty. Any property owned by his spouse would reduce the amount 
of the deduction dollar for dollar, regardless of the source from 
which the property came. As we have pointed out in some detail 
earlier,104 only a formula based on the total holdings of both 
spouses can approach the philosophy behind the community 
system. 
Whether or not these suggestions are of value and would pro-
vide a feasible and workable solution to the dilemma of equaliza-
103 Cf. Sugarman, "Estate and Gift Tax Equalization-The Marital Deduction,'' 36 
CALIF. L. REv. 223 at 280 (1948). 
104 See Part I, A, 2 supra. 
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tion will depend upon the thought and criticism that can be 
brought to bear upon them. Perhaps the changes brought for-
ward here would only serve to complicate even more an already 
complicated problem. But, on the other hand, these suggestions 
may ultimately prove to be an acceptable solution to our present 
difficulties and complexities. Only further study and criticism 
can give the answer. · 
